– SANTOSH SHARMA POUDEL

The column originally appeared in The Diplomat on 31 July 2023. Please read the original article here.

Nepal is engaged in a fierce debate about rightsizing its army.

Statements by two members of parliament ignited the debate. On June 20, parliamentarian Swarnim Waglé warned that Nepal is headed to a disaster if the “difficult” decision of rightsizing the military is not taken. Citing the reduction of troops in Sri Lanka in the wake of the economic crisis, the Rashtriya Swatantra Party MP said that Nepal did not need 90,000 troops.

Ten days later, former Foreign Minister Bimala Rai Poudyal questioned the utility of a large troop force during peacetime. She argued that the risk of a physical attack on Nepal from the neighboring countries was low and pointed out that even if they did attack, the Nepali Army could not win against them.

The statements triggered a furor on social and traditional media. Following criticism from the public and senior retired military personnel, the two clarified or toned down their statements. Waglé conceded that “whatever is done should be done with the consent of the security agencies.” Similarly, Poudyal explained that she was merely “seeking an answer from the government and defense minister whether we need the current size of Nepal Army.”

Defense Minister Purna Bahadur Khadka has clarified that there is no plan to reduce the army’s size.

The argument for downsizing the military is often based on the economic costs of maintaining the 96,000-strong force, although Poudyal denied making such an argument.

Nepal allocated 58.84 billion Nepali rupees ($450 million), accounting for 3.5 percent of the total government expenditure for 2023-24.

As the graph below shows, the military budget, as a proportion of government expenditure, increased significantly since 2001, when the Nepal Army was mobilized to counter the Maoist insurgency. It reached its peak in 2005 and has declined consistently since. Nepal’s military expenditure, whether measured as a proportion of government expenditure or GDP, is below the world average. Thus, there is little economic rationale for downsizing the budget of the defense agency or troop size to cut costs.

However, the Nepal Army spends 90 percent of its allocated budget on recurrent expenditure and only 9.6 percent on capital expenditure. This is more worrying, for it means that the Nepal Army is investing less in the future. Any downsizing of the military, without reducing the overall budget, would free a larger share of the budget for the military to invest in modern technologies for the future.

The size of the army also becomes an issue because of the expanding footprint of the military into non-core areas, such as the construction of infrastructure and even business ventures. As a result, the army has become sluggish regarding combat readiness and deployment.

Hence, the debate is not about merely downsizing to cut costs but professionalizing the military.

The more pertinent question raised by Poudyal relates to the overall “utility” of the military. Citing repeated instances of border encroachment, she alleged that the army has failed in its primary role: to protect Nepal’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Poudyal pointed out that Nepal’s army would not be able to withstand any war with neighboring countries.

Given China and India’s relative size and power, such an assumption may sound logical. Nevertheless, analyzing the role of the military in such stark terms is a gross misunderstanding and reductive. The military’s role is not just to win wars but to thwart such attacks before they happen and defend the territory if attacked.

A look at what is unfolding in Ukraine, where a relatively more minor force has been able to withstand attacks from a larger and wealthier country, gives a broader understanding of the role of the military.

Issues including the nature and the role of the military should be debated. However, ensuring that such debate is proper and not disparaging to the force that is ultimately responsible for the nation’s security is also essential.

Equally concerning is the nature of the backlash received by the parliamentarians and the defensiveness of the army.

Poudyal’s social media was flooded with comments about her being a sellout, an agent of a foreign country, or taking up the issue to weaken the military.

As a parliamentarian in a country where the army operates under civilian rule, she has every right and responsibility to debate the military’s size and role. Such debate is overdue. The size of Nepal’s military almost doubled during the Maoist insurgency, increasing from 45,000 to 96,000 now. Now that the domestic political context has changed, as have the regional and global dynamics, there should be a corresponding debate on the role and security strategy of the country.

Therefore, the defensiveness of the military force is worrying.

In March, Army Chief General Prabhu Ram Sharma dismissed the calls for downsizing by “self-proclaimed academics, experts, and security experts working in non-governmental organizations and international non-governmental organizations.” He called them “outsiders” working at the behest of foreign powers. Now, the military has responded quietly, saying that the government determines the army’s size based on the needs.

However, retired military officials have taken up the mantle of counterpunch.

Former Army Chief General Gaurav S.J.B. Rana slammed the calls for downsizing the military as “undeveloped” and “unschooled opinion.” Stating that the military is a valuable asset of the state to be cherished, Rana insisted that the “process to determine the size, composition, and capabilities of the military is best left to the military professionals, under the stewardship of the government.”

Meanwhile, another retired army chief, General Binoj Basnyat, called for doing away with the costly federal system, among others, to bring in enough resources required for national development.

Besides, both Rana and Basnyat point out that the military remains the most trusted institution in the country and, thus, should not be questioned.

As per a survey, 91.2 percent of Nepali people trusted the military, compared to 44 percent who trusted political parties. Therefore, they argue that the army is a far more responsible actor and absolved of any public debate.

Their comments imply that the Nepal Army should not be questioned. Indeed, parliamentarians are also cautious when talking about the military. Poudyal said that she was discouraged by senior leaders of different parties from talking about the military issues a few days after her statement caused public fury.

In saying that, there are commonalities between those seeking a debate on the army’s role and those defensive about any discussion. Both understand that regional and global geopolitical currents are changing rapidly; a war between two countries, seen as unlikely over the past few decades, has become a reality today.

Such geopolitical changes have thrust Nepal into the center of regional and global geopolitical tussles. Together with the changed domestic security context, a discussion of security strategy and the military’s corresponding size, shape, and form is much needed. The Nepali military of 2005 will not be able to meet the challenges of today.

However, when civilian leaders debate the size and role of the military, the military understands it as “downsizing,” making it defensive.

Therefore, the first step is bridging the trust gap between the civilian and military leadership. Then both sides can sit together and rationally chart the way appropriate for the current and future needs of the country and reform the military as per need.

– SANTOSH Sharma Poudel

The column originally appeared in The Diplomat on 27 April 2023. Please read the original article here.

Nepal is hosting the ACC (Asian Cricket Council) Premier Cup, the winner of which will qualify to participate in the Asia Cup, the cricket tournament in which Asia’s top six teams will contend for the title. Nepal is only two wins away from winning the ACC Cup. If it wins, it will play alongside India and Pakistan in the Asia Cup in September.

This marks a remarkable reversal in Nepal’s nascent cricketing fortunes. Just months ago, it was on the verge of losing its ODI (One Day International) status.

Unlike other South Asian countries, Nepal is not a cricketing power. But it hopes to be there in the coming years.

Cricket made its way to Nepal via the young Ranas, who came from Nepal’s ruling family and had gone to England and India (then a British colony) for higher education in the 1920s. The game was limited to the elites.

Cricket became popular among the masses only in the 1990s. Nepal became an associate member of the International Cricket Council (ICC), which governs global cricket, in 1996. Since then, cricket has captured the imagination of Nepali youth and has become the most popular sport in the country. Its popularity off-field has matched Nepal’s progress in the game. Nepal has scaled up the tiers of cricket and appeared in an ICC global event at the 2014 ICC World Twenty20, the game’s shortest format.

It gained ODI status in 2018. Currently, the ICC ranks Nepal 14th and 16th in the ODI and Twenty20 (T20) formats of the games, respectively.

Cricket has provided rare national unity and pride among Nepalis at home and abroad. The Nepali team’s performances have sparked hope and joy among Nepalis with little else to cheer for.

In a way, Nepali cricket reflects the challenges that the country faces.

First, there is limited infrastructure. Nepal had only two cricketing grounds where international matches were played for a long time. It has recently added a third ground. All three, however, can hardly be called modern stadiums by any standards.

Second, instability and mismanagement run deep. Monty Desai, the current national coach, is the seventh since 2018. The politicization of the Cricket Association of Nepal (CAN), the governing body for all cricket in the country, led to Nepal’s suspension in 2016 for breach of “ICC regulations which prohibit government interference and require free and fair elections.” Nepal was reinstated in 2019. Similarly, Nepal’s rollout of a T20 league, which held the inaugural tournament in December 2022-January 2023, was poorly organized. Some foreign players left mid-tournament over clashes with organizers, while other matches were affected by teams not paying the players’ salaries on time.

Third, corruption remains rife. The inaugural T20 tournament was a hotbed for spot-fixing, a practice of bribing players for specific actions during specific times to influence the betting results. A Central Investigation Bureau investigation unearthed that franchise owners and the Seven3Sports, an Indian company that was the commercial and strategic partner of the league, were engaged in the corrupt practice. Seven3Sports’ cofounder was the mastermind. Two former cricketers were arrested on a charge of supporting the fixers. It felt as if the whole league was organized to help corrupt betting practices.

Fourth, Nepal’s captain, Sandip Lamichhane, was accused of raping a minor and suspended from all cricketing activities following an arrest warrant issued against him in September 2022. Lamichhane, the most high-profile Nepali cricket player, has played in domestic leagues worldwide, including the Indian Premier League (IPL). Following the high court’s decision to grant him conditional bail, the CAN overturned his suspension. Nepali youth marched in protest against allowing an accused rapist on the team. Even the Scottish players refused to shake hands with Lamichhane before a match between the two nations in February.

Despite the challenges, the team has competed well on the field. The cricket-crazy Nepali crowd has provided excellent support. Spectators have flocked to matches, whether in Nepal or abroad, adorned with national flags, making deafening noise of support. Cricket is no longer just a sport in Nepal but a religion.

The cricket team’s challenges mirror Nepal’s struggles and the Nepali people’s hope, regardless of the conditions. Cricket fans have catapulted Nepali cricketers to the status of rock stars. The sport has brought the country together and given something to Nepalis to celebrate.

Even though the British colonizers left South Asia more than seven decades ago, their influence can be fully felt in cricket. Nepal’s rise makes it the sixth country in South Asia among the top 16 globally ranked cricket-playing countries.

Afghanistan’s ascent to the top was even steeper and quicker. In a 2010 meeting with then-Afghan President Hamid Karzai, former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton cited Afghan cricket as the model for Afghanistan to follow. “If we [the U.S. and Afghanistan] are searching for a model to meet international challenges with skill, dedication, and teamwork, we need only look to the Afghan national cricket team,” she said. In 2017, Afghanistan became a full member of the ICC, although that status is now imperiled by the Taliban regime’s refusal to allow women to play the sport.

Along with the economic center of gravity shifting to Asia, the center of global cricket has shifted to South Asia, particularly India. India generates around 90 percent of cricket’s global revenues. Add the mad love for cricket in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and Nepal — the region is a cricketing behemoth.

While some critics in the West are not comfortable with the dominance of cricket by a non-White country, India has played a vital role in developing the game in the region. Nepal’s progress opens up further opportunities and the need for deeper cricketing cooperation in the region, especially in India. It would greatly support the development of Nepali cricket if India allowed some Nepali cricketers to participate in their domestic trophies. It would give Nepali cricketers greater exposure and a chance to compete with and learn from more skilled players. In addition, Nepal and India need to cooperate more closely to control corruption in the game.

– SANTOSH Sharma Poudel

The column originally appeared in The Diplomat on 18 April 2023. Please read the original article here.

Kathmandu has been abuzz with discussion about Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s visit to India. Initially planned for April, the visit has been postponed now to early May.

Since his swearing-in as Nepal’s prime minister in late December of last year, Dahal has publicly stated his interest in making New Delhi his first foreign destination. He has repeated this intention time and again.

Nepal’s prime ministers have traditionally chosen New Delhi for their first foreign trip. Dahal was the last prime minister to buck the trend when he assumed the role of prime minister for the first time in 2008. Then, he visited Beijing to attend the Olympics closing ceremony, drawing criticism at home and in New Delhi for flying first to Nepal’s northern neighbor, China.

India is so central in Nepal’s diplomacy and domestic politics that the first visit of a Nepali prime minister to New Delhi is assumed.

While newly appointed Nepali prime ministers often rush to visit India, New Delhi has not always shown similar urgency to meet them. Dahal’s immediate predecessor, former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba, had to wait nine months before he could visit India. Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli, who preceded Deuba, got to visit the Indian capital within two months after he became the premier. During his last tenure as prime minister (2016-17) Dahal got to visit New Delhi four months after he took over the reins.

India rushed to welcome Oli in 2018 because it wanted to rebuild ties with Kathmandu that had been severely strained by its blockade of landlocked Nepal in 2015. It also saw Oli as a powerful leader, potentially at the helm of the Nepali government for five years. New Delhi was proactive in seeking to ensure that Oli would not lean to Beijing as he did during his previous tenure (2015-16). Besides, the Indian government wanted to project successful diplomacy in its neighborhood.

What explains the delay in Dahal’s visit to New Delhi?

First, since becoming prime minister Dahal has spent his entire energy managing and surviving domestic politics. In the last four months, he has changed coalition partners and is yet to form a government fully. After the Oli-led Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) withdrew from the government, Dahal was in charge of 16 ministerial portfolios, including foreign affairs. He finally appointed N.P. Saud of the Nepali Congress (NC) as the foreign minister on April 16. It is not a surprise then that without a lieutenant on his side, Dahal’s diplomatic plans suffered. The cabinet expansion is expected to be complete soon, so he can finally glance beyond domestic politics.

Second, Dahal’s grip over power appears tenuous. His party, the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Centre (CPN-MC) came in a distant third in the 2022 general elections, winning a mere 11 percent of the votes. While he was able to play on the insecurities of Deuba and Oli to propel himself to the prime minister’s post, his alliance with the Oli-led CPN-UML was a partnership of strange bedfellows, one that was doomed to fail given their past tumultuous relations and the fact that Dahal had a pre-poll alliance with the Deuba-led NC. With the NC actively looking to wedge them apart, the coalition soon fell. New Delhi might have calculated that there was little to gain from the visit of a flailing prime minister. India was therefore not in a hurry to meet Dahal.

Finally, five months after the general elections, Nepali politics look somewhat settled by Nepali standards. Hence, diplomacy, and the trip to New Delhi, is back among the priorities for the Dahal government.

Several outstanding issues in India-Nepal relations require immediate attention.

Among the primary concerns for Nepal is the connectivity: land, air, and power. The detailed project report for the 136-km-long Raxaul-Kathmandu broad-gauge railway is complete. India and Nepal will be holding a meeting of the joint working group on the railway project this week and expect to sign an agreement on the construction and funding modality during Dahal’s upcoming visit.

Nepal has been seeking Indian permission for air routes to efficiently operate the Gautam Buddha International Airport (GBIA) and Pokhara International Airport (both of which, incidentally, were built by Chinese firms). Nepal has requested India to provide three additional entry routes and an agreement on near-border operation for the GBIA to make international flights to the newly built airports economically feasible. Dahal would like to secure agreements for at least two entry points.

The two countries signed a Joint Vision Statement on Power Sector Cooperation during Deuba’s visit to New Delhi in 2022. Cross-border power transmission infrastructure and bi-directional power trade based on market demand are core components of the agreement. Based on it, India has permitted Nepal to export up to 364 MW of hydroelectricity. Nepal seeks to expand the scope and depth of the agreement. It seeks further Indian investment in hydroelectricity, permission for more energy exports to India, and Indian cooperation for exporting hydroelectricity produced in Nepal to Bangladesh via India.

The two neighbors had a fallout over the Agnipath scheme introduced last year. Under the scheme, the Indian Army recruits young soldiers (Agniveers) for four years, after which three in four Agniveers will retire from the Army with a $15,000 severance package. This goes against the 1947 tripartite agreement Nepal signed with India and the United Kingdom, which requires India and the U.K. to provide pensions to the Gurkha soldiers recruited from Nepal. As a result of the spat with India on the matter, India’s recruitment of Gurkhas from Nepal has been postponed since last year. Nepal would seek an amicable solution during the visit.

Besides these concerns, there are other stock issues, such as the territorial dispute along Nepal’s western border with India, border management, and a host of other economic issues to be dealt with. On top of that, the Dahal government will have to allay New Delhi’s apprehensions over Nepal’s increased engagement of Beijing and Washington. It will have to assure New Delhi that these engagements will not come at the cost of legitimate Indian interests in Nepal. These issues make Dahal’s visit to New Delhi in May critical.

Reports say that the visit dates have been finalized but will only be disclosed once some agendas get a concrete shape. Sherpas from both countries are working on the draft of the final agreement to be signed in New Delhi.

Dahal has shown his Machiavellian traits to become the premier. We will find out soon if he is any good at diplomacy.

– SANTOSH Sharma Poudel

“An ambassador is not just an emissary but a bridge, a mediator between cultures and countries.” – Robert Blackwill

Ambassadors are among the key cogs in the conduct of diplomacy. They are responsible for promoting their respective countries’ national interests, negotiating and navigating with policymakers, providing information and recommendations based on ground information, facilitating diplomatic and economic relations, and promoting the home countries in the host countries, among others. Essentially, they are the face of their home countries and the bridge to the host countries.

Besides their roles, the ‘face’ of the ambassadors can also be a source of signaling. For example, the profile of the ambassadors appointed could hint at the importance of the country and the kind of image the home country would like to project abroad. 

I have briefly analyzed what ambassadors’ ‘faces’ hint at in this article from a gendered lens. To do so, I have looked at the resident ambassadors from foreign countries to Nepal, including the UN country representative (or the last ambassador if there is no ambassador currently appointed, and current Nepali ambassadors stationed in Nepali embassies abroad from a gendered lens. The summary is just a snapshot of the scenario and not a trend. Hence, this should not be over-generalized or extrapolated to analyze the ‘face’ of specific countries across time and space. Also, the article does not compare the effectiveness of the roles performed by ambassadors of various genders, though that is an area for further research.

The following table provides the summary:

The table shows that eight of the 26 resident foreign ambassadors in Kathmandu (including the UN Country representative) are women. The women ambassadors account for one in three resident ambassadors. Among the OECD members (including the UN), half of the 12 ambassadors are women. Sri Lanka and Egypt are the only two women ambassadors from non-OECD countries. The UN and the OECD members have been at the forefront of promoting gender equality in Nepal. Their appointment of ambassadors reflects that message. 

On the other side, Nepal has 30 embassies abroad and three permanent UN missions. Of the 33 ambassadors, only three are women. In other words, Nepal has appointed ten men ambassadors for every one woman ambassador. This shows that, despite government policies, men dominate Nepal’s diplomacy. The three women ambassadors are appointed to the OECD member countries (Israel, South Korea, and Spain). It could be because Nepal wants to portray progress made on gender equality in those advanced countries which largely provide aid in the sector.

Nepal has taken critical legal steps to ensure women’s representation in the political, bureaucratic, and social arena. Despite the efforts, most areas are highly male-dominated with some token women representation. Even at the MoFA, the senior posts (joint secretaries) are men-dominated. In this context, the lower number of women ambassadors only reflects the limited presence of women in diplomacy. Women’s presence is also negligible among the ‘foreign policy experts’ outside formal diplomacy.

In this context, the government should prioritize the appointment of women ambassadors based on political affiliation/expertise to compensate for the numerical gap at the senior level in the MoFA until MoFA becomes more representative at the senior level. It is high time that Nepal’s face is represented abroad by ‘representative’ ambassadors.

This blog is a part of NIPoRe’s blog series on Women’s History Month 2023.

– SANTOSH Sharma Poudel

The column originally appeared in The Diplomat on 6 March 2023. Please read the original article here.

On February 27, the Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli-led Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) withdrew its support for the Pushpa Kamal Dahal-led government. The CPN-UML ministers resigned en masse, bringing down the curtain on the seven-party coalition government that was formed in Nepal barely two months ago.

To start with, this was a coalition of strange bedfellows, with parties with opposing agendas and ideologies coming together. Their lust for power was their common agenda.

Prime Minister Dahal will likely continue to lead the next government with the support of the Sher Bahadur Deuba-led Nepali Congress (NC) and six smaller parties. This marks a return to the pre-poll alliance of 2022.

Differences over the election of the new president, scheduled for March 9, provided the immediate cause for the downfall of the coalition government. In a power-sharing agreement between Dahal and Oli, the former had agreed to support the CPN-UML’s presidential candidate. However, Dahal reneged and decided to support the NC’s candidate instead.

The president is the ceremonial head of state, who is to perform all functions “on the recommendation and with the consent of the council of ministers.” However, the presidency has effectively become a permanent, untouchable veto-wielding power. Elected for five years by an electoral college, the president can only be impeached by a two-thirds majority of the Parliament, a number beyond the current fractured coalitions in Nepal. Therefore, current President Bidhya Devi Bhandari faced no consequence for approving the dissolution of the parliament twice, despite the Supreme Court reinstating parliament both times, and holding off approval of the citizenship bill despite a constitutional mandate.

Oli is miffed at Dahal’s intransigence. He knew he would control all the government strings if the president was his lieutenant. He headed the largest party in the coalition by a mile; his party leads both houses of parliament and the commissioners of many constitutional committees are his acolytes. Dahal, though the prime minister, would have been a lame duck.

That was obvious to Dahal too.

Dahal was able to play the NC and CPN-UML to remain at the center of Nepali politics despite his party winning only 29 of 275 seats in the federal parliament. That the NC voted to support his government earlier this year, despite Dahal ditching it at the last minute during government formation, did not go unnoticed.

Sources close to Dahal argue that he was taken aback after Oli showed no remorse for his attempts to dissolve the Parliament twice in 2020 and 2021 during the parliamentary address.

Dahal and Oli do not share a cordial personal relationship. Oli’s CPN-UML and Dahal’s Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Center (CPN-MC) merged to form a powerful Nepal Communist Party in 2018, with the two as co-chairs. However, the union barely lasted for two years because of the rift between the two leaders. They clashed in the public domain, attacking each other personally.

Their coming together after the 2022 elections to form a government was instrumental and not a rekindling of their relationship. Dahal’s interest in being the prime minister and Oli’s interest in breaking the NC and CPN-MC coalition led to their partnership. However, the coalition shattered as soon as interests diverged again.

Meanwhile, Deuba maintained a dignified silence and did not criticize Dahal even after the Maoist leader “betrayed” him to form the government with Oli’s support.

After pulling out support, the CPN-UML has insinuated that Dahal came under “foreign influence.” CPN-UML General Secretary Shankar Pokharel said that “external powers did not prefer the current government [of which CPN-UML was a part], and were potentially instrumental in the government change.” India and the United States were especially active this time, he observed, noting that “the [foreign] power centers did not want the CPN-UML to dominate the government.”

Visits by India’s Foreign Secretary Vinay Mohan Kwatra and four retired army generals in February and the flurry of visits by U.S. officials lend some credence to the allegations. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) chief had also requested to visit Nepal, but the Nepali government felt it was not an appropriate time.

According to some analysts, India prefers a “controlled chaos” in Nepal. A strong and unified government in Nepal is not seen by officials in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs or its embassy in Nepal to be in India’s interest.

Additionally, the India-Nepal relationship was at its lowest ebb during Oli’s reign (2018-21) over the territorial dispute between the two countries. Although India and the U.S. are much closer than they were in the past, especially when it comes to China, New Delhi is concerned about increased and direct U.S. engagement in Nepal because it undercuts Indian influence in Nepal.

Nepal’s increased geostrategic importance and the implementation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a $500 million grant for infrastructure projects, has led to the increased U.S. presence. With the NC set to join the government, it brings into power the coalition that ratified the MCC in February last year.

There is no denying the role of external powers, but it would be foolhardy to discount the role of the personal vested interests of key Nepali leaders in Nepal’s current political instability. The lust for power is the main reason why Dahal left his electoral alliance partner, the NC, and formed a government with the support of the CPN-UML. It explains why Oli assured Deuba that he would not support Dahal for prime minister till the last moment, only to do a volte-face. These are merely the results of instrumentality where the only currency is power. Because the leaders do not want to spell this out publicly, they hide behind blaming “hidden interests” and “external powers” for the political instability.

– SANTOSH Sharma Poudel

The column originally appeared in The Diplomat on 8 February 2023. Please read the original article here.

On February 6, the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) decided to quit the coalition government led by Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Center (CPN-MC) supremo Pushpa Kamal Dahal. The party lasted barely a month in the government.

Its leader, Rabi Lamichhane, decided to quit the government after Dahal refused to give the Home Ministry portfolio to the party. However, the party has not withdrawn support for the government, leaving the door open for rejoining the ruling coalition in the future.

This is a dramatic change in course for the six-month-old party.

The RSP had a rapid ascent to power as it emerged as the fourth largest party, winning 20 seats (out of 275) in the November 2022 elections. It landed four ministries, including the Home Ministry, in the power-sharing agreement among the seven-party ruling coalition formed after that.

Lamichhane became the deputy prime minister and home minister. His ascent was unprecedented in Nepali political history. On his return to Nepal in 2016, he hosted a popular talk show on television and then launched his own television company.

However, Lamichhane’s appointment as the home minister was controversial to start with. The investigation about his citizenship and passport was ongoing. Lamichhane had taken American citizenship in 2014, rendering his Nepali citizenship invalid. He left his American citizenship in 2018 and was eligible for Nepali citizenship, yet he did not go through the due process. In between, he also had a Nepali passport issued using the “invalid” citizenship certificate. Ironically, the Home Ministry is responsible for carrying out those investigations.

On January 27, Nepal’s Supreme Court ruled that Lamichhane did not hold a valid citizenship certificate and scrapped his status as a member of parliament and president of RSP. A day after the verdict, he followed due process, acquired the Nepali citizenship certificate, and returned as the RSP president.

After the court’s verdict, Dahal decided to keep the Home Ministry portfolio to himself and refused to give it to Lamichhane, who was ineligible because he was no longer a parliament member, or any other parliamentarian from the RSP.

After the decision to leave the government, RSP organized a press conference where Lamichhane had an outburst, to put it mildly. In an hour-and-half rant, he went after the media in a rage. He accused the media – specifically Kantipur Media Group – of targeting him by headlining his citizenship front and center and held them responsible for his ouster from the government. He even threatened the media that he would incite his supporters to “punish” media houses if they dared write “wrong” news about him.

Lamichhane is in his own league when it comes to hogging the limelight. His outburst is also not out of character. Nepali media and opinion makers have roundly criticized him for the outburst. However, his supporters have stood firmly in support of “exposing” the reality of Nepali media.

RSP’s quitting of the government has an immediate impact on Nepali politics.

First, RSP and its leaders were the dark horses in Nepali politics. Despite their performance in the election, people did not know where the party stood ideologically or how they would participate in governance. People voted in droves for the party expecting it to be the alternative to the establishment, which was corrupt and cared only about gaining power.

While a month is not enough to judge the party, it has hardly shown itself to be different from the others.

Second, RSP was billed as a coalition of independents. Nevertheless, the recent development shows that the party is Lamichhane, and Lamichhane is the party. There were dissenting voices on whether RSP should quit the government. However, Lamichhane hardly engaged his party officials and issued a diktat that the party would withdraw from the ruling coalition.

Third, RSP’s quitting of the government has increased the trust deficit between the CPN-MC and Khadga Prasad Oli-led Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML), the two major parties in the ruling coalition. Dahal and Oli shared a contentious relationship before this, and their differences started to increase with the apparent closeness between Dahal and Sher Bahadur Deuba of the Nepali Congress (NC), despite Dahal ditching Deuba to form a coalition government with Oli.

Dahal has kept Deuba close in order to limit Oli’s influence in the coalition, whereas Deuba is eying Dahal’s support in electing an NC candidate for the upcoming presidential election. In the longer term, Deuba would like to break the Dahal-Oli partnership to gain power, just like Oli broke the Dahal-Deuba partnership.

With presidential elections coming up, the CPN-UML has come out supporting RSP, even trivializing the court’s verdict about Lamichhane’s citizenship. Two other coalition partners have yet to join the government. RSP’s exit means only four parties from the original seven-party coalition are participating in the government.

The longer-term implications are more concerning than the short-term impact on coalition dynamics.

Lamichhane’s outburst is an ominous sign in Nepali politics. He was a populist and was known to play to the crowd. He emerged in the political scene riding the anti-establishment wave. Now, he is discrediting Nepal’s chaotic but relatively free media. In doing so, he has lumped the media in with the corrupt establishment, and projected himself as the one who can challenge the status quo.

His tantrum on February 6 played differently to audiences. His supporters saw a leader willing to take on the powerful elements of the “swamp” and challenge the establishment. Meanwhile, his speech gave enough ammunition to his detractors about his political priorities and temperament. The gap between his supporters and detractors has widened as a result and will continue to grow.

Lamichhane’s rant also carried concerning signs. He played the victim that the establishment was trying to corner. He alleged that he had been targeted relentlessly because some elements of the establishment would be “exposed” if he continued as the home minister. By projecting himself as the only one who can challenge the establishment, he is building a personality cult.

He dared some members of the “swamp” to contest him in elections or shut up. He attacked the media for reporting on his citizenship and insinuated that they were not to be trusted. These are Trumpian tactics, and indeed his politics is shaped by Donald Trump’s success in 2016 in the United States.

This is not to suggest that Lamichhane will walk the Trumpian way. For a start, Nepal has a parliamentary system. Even populists such as Oli have found it challenging to have a singular hold on the Nepali political structure. However, expect the anti-establishment voices to be louder and politics more divisive as voters turn into followers and distrust the establishment or the media.

– SANTOSH Sharma Poudel

The column originally appeared in The Diplomat on 27 January 2023. Please read the original article here.

On January 15, a Yeti Airlines aircraft carrying 72 people, including four crew members, crashed a few kilometers away from Pokhara International Airport (PIA). Fifty-seven of those on board the aircraft were Nepalis and 15 were foreigners. This is the deadliest air crash in Nepal in the last three decades.

The crash came barely a fortnight after Pokhara International Airport began operations.

Apparently, the pilot did not report “anything untoward,” and PIA is among the “easier” airports in Nepal to navigate. An investigation is underway to identify the cause of the crash.

Nepal is no stranger to airplane crashes. It has been barely eight months since the last crash; a Tara Air plane crashed in May 2022 killing all 22 on board. In the last decade alone, there have been 20 crashes.

The mountainous terrain of Nepal means that air travel is the only option to reach some places. Even with alternatives, poor road infrastructure, short air travel, and increased disposable income have led to a rapid increase in the number of air travelers.

Investment in air travel infrastructure has also increased; over the last eight months, two new international airports have started operations.

The Yeti Air crash has raised concerns over air safety in Nepal. The role of aircraft operators and pilots as well as equipment is under the scanner.

First, Nepali aircraft operators cannot afford to buy new aircraft, forcing many to opt for cheaper used aircraft. Operators are said to have complied with only four of five accident investigation recommendations for air safety. Their close links to influential political leaders shield them from scrutiny, even when they flout the safety regulations. Many airports have not followed simple fencing, parking, and emergency vehicle standards.

Second, Nepali pilots are generally well-qualified, but there have been cases of indiscipline. Recently, three Nepal Airlines Corporation (NAC) pilots were barred from flying after they disobeyed instructions from the air traffic control (ATC) specialists in Hong Kong. Two more pilots have been grounded for failure to adhere to ATC’s instructions.

Third, Nepal’s air operating and safety mechanism is a mess. Corruption is rampant across the board. Aviation corruption has even brought down a prime minister. The Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal (CAAN) is the service provider and regulator of the aviation sector in Nepal. This has engendered a conflict of interest, especially regarding safety regulations. Ironically, the Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Civil Aviation has not complied with about half the accident investigation recommendations directed to the ministry.

It is partly because of these risks that the European Union has imposed a blanket ban on Nepali airlines flying in European airspace.

The committee investigating the latest air crash will submit the report, detail the cause of the crash, and issue recommendations to improve air safety. However, it is unlikely to make much of an impact on Nepal’s current air safety regime.

The crash is also unlikely to dent air travel in Nepal. Currently, many Nepalis and foreign tourists are anxious about air safety. Pokhara is a major tourist destination for domestic and foreign tourists. After the crash, local businesses reported a decrease in visitors to Pokhara. However, as weeks pass by, the necessity of air travel will override the anxiety about air safety, and aviation patterns will return to normal. Nevertheless, in the short term, it will impact tourism, which was slowly gaining momentum after a two-year disruption due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

There could be a fall in Indian tourist arrivals by flights to Nepal. More Indian tourists could opt for travel by the overland route to Nepal, at least in the short term.

Prominent Indian newspapers have used the tragedy to box China and BRI. They have highlighted that the newly inaugurated international airport was built with Chinese support. Some have drawn attention to the controversy that China claimed the airport was a Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project. While the statements are factual, the reporting gives the impression that Indian newspapers see this as an opportunity to get back at China. It is a pity that the Indian press has shown little sensitivity to the tragic incident itself.

The crash also provides ex post facto justification for the EU’s ban on Nepali airlines in the EU airspace. At this point, the EU’s pressure on Nepal to make institutional changes to air safety could provide the impetus to Nepal to address the dire situation.

– SANTOSH Sharma Poudel

The column originally appeared in The Diplomat on 16 January 2023. Please read the original article here.

Nepali politics continues to confound observers. Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Center (CPN-MC) chief Pushpa Kamal Dahal, who was sworn in as prime minister on December 26 despite his party standing third in the recent general elections, received a strong but surprising boost in a trust vote in parliament on January 10 when his former electoral alliance partners, the Sher Bahadur Deuba-led Nepali Congress (NC) and the Madhav Kumar Nepal-led Communist Party of Nepal-United Socialist (CPN-US), voted in support of his new government.

Less than a fortnight ago, Dahal ditched the NC and CPN-US to head a government with support from the Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli-led Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML). NC and CPN-US backed Dahal in the confidence vote despite his last-minute betrayal.

The decision of the NC and CPN-US to support Dahal has become the topic of much discussion in Nepal. Some speculate that Deuba might have supported Dahal in an attempt to secure a share in the spoils of power. Others see Deuba’s move as aimed at driving a wedge between Dahal and Oli. Meanwhile, others see it as a shrewd move by Dahal to minimize Oli’s influence in the ruling coalition. Whatever the reason, it is evident that instrumentalism determines Nepali politics, and that gaining power is the only currency.

The ruling coalition comprises parties with diverse interests and political goals. Its survival and domestic issues will be Prime Minister Dahal’s primary focus. Speeches of leaders in the new parliament focused on domestic issues like good governance, political stability, corruption control, and effective implementation of federalism.

Coalition partners wield considerable leverage in the new government and Oli, who heads the largest party in this coalition, will exercise significant control. He leads the mechanism to support the government and develop a common minimum program for the coalition government. His leverage will increase if the presidency or the house speakership (or both) go to the CPN-UML. Dahal seems to be in for a rough ride.

Meanwhile, several issues on the foreign policy front deserve Dahal’s immediate attention. The need for Nepal to “balance” its engagement with the big powers – India, the U.S., and China – in the context of heightened Sino-Indian and Sino-U.S. competition while maintaining strategic autonomy and sovereignty will be a major challenge. Another is Nepal’s widening trade deficit. Such challenges have intensified in recent times.

Dahal will need to tackle several issues with India. Firstly, he will need to decide on India’s Agnipath scheme. The previous government, of which Dahal’s party was a coalition partner, kicked the Agnipath can down the road for the next government to deal with. The Agnipath scheme provides for short-term recruitment into the Indian Army, which violates the tripartite agreement between Nepal, Great Britain and India regarding the recruitment of Nepali Gurkhas into the Indian and British armies. Last year, such recruitment in Nepal was suspended because Kathmandu was opposed to the short-term recruitment of Nepalis into the Indian Army. The current government does not have the luxury of delaying a decision on the matter as Gurkha recruitment from Nepal, which has been a critical element in Indo-Nepal relations, is in jeopardy.

Secondly, Nepal needs New Delhi’s cooperation to export hydroelectricity to Bangladesh. In August last year, Nepal and Bangladesh decided to request India to allow the export of 40-50 MW of Nepali hydropower to Bangladesh as Nepal needs to use the Indian grid (via Indian territory) to export electricity to Bangladesh.

When Nepali officials raised the issue during the recent Power Summit organized by the Confederation of Indian Industries on grid connectivity in the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Indian officials said that the Baharampur-Bheramara line connecting Nepal to Bangladesh was “fully occupied.” Therefore, the issue will test Dahal’s diplomatic skills.

Thirdly, Nepal has requested that India grant air entry points to facilitate aircraft movement to Bhairahawa and Pokhara. The two airports were built by Chinese companies, though the former was funded by the Asian Development Bank. Without India granting appropriate entry points, airplanes will need to circle in Nepal for a few minutes before landing, increasing operational costs. Kathmandu should engage India at the earliest to ensure the international airports are sustainable for airlines to use.

Fourthly, Dahal needs to continue the “return to normalcy” in India-Nepal relations after its nadir in 2020, when the Oli government amended the Nepali map to include Kalapani, Limpiyadhura, and Lipulekh in the far west – territories also claimed by India.

There are also issues with China that require immediate attention. One is China’s opening of the Kerung border point. This was closed with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic but was reopened after Dahal assumed the premiership recently. There are concerns in Nepal over the reopening of this border point amid the surge in COVID-19 cases in China.

Nepal needs clarity on its position on Global Security Initiative (GSI), a Chinese initiative to counter rival regional blocs such as the Quad. Beijing is keen for Nepal to join the GSI. Although Nepal has clarified its commitment to non-alignment, which would mean Nepal will not join any security pacts with any country, President Bidhya Devi Bhandari joined the GSI meeting last year despite the Deuba-led government’s reservations.

Also, Beijing is impatient to see projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) take off in Nepal. Days after Dahal’s appointment as prime minister, a Chinese delegation came to Nepal to conduct a feasibility study of the Kathmandu-Kerung railway connectivity. With a friendlier government in power, Beijing would like to see BRI projects make concrete progress.

Whether Dahal makes New Delhi or Beijing the destination of his first foreign visit will be keenly watched. However, it will be pragmatic if he were to pick New Delhi first, ceteris paribus. As much as his visit to Beijing would show that he is attempting to balance between Nepal’s two giant neighbors, which every leader in Nepal professes and which is the official foreign policy, the fact is that Nepal has more issues that require immediate engagement with its southern neighbor.

Kathmandu is abuzz with speculation that New Delhi wanted Deuba, not Dahal, to lead the new government. However, despite New Delhi’s suspicions of Dahal and Dahal’s earlier misgivings regarding New Delhi, Nepal needs healthy relations with India. He might get a warmer welcome in Beijing than in New Delhi. Yet, a visit to New Delhi will show his intent to tackle difficult issues head-on, not shy away from them.

In this context, his decision to make New Delhi the first port of call, likely to be in late February or early March, is a mature decision. He has the experience of engaging India as prime minister and has a host of immediate and enduring issues on his plate. His level of success in resolving those issues will determine his legacy.

– SANTOSH Sharma Poudel

The column originally appeared in The Diplomat on 30 December 2022. Please read the original article here.

On December 27, a team of Chinese experts landed in Nepal to conduct the feasibility study of the Kathmandu-Kerung (Geelong) railway. On the same day, China opened the Rasuwagadhi border point, which had remained closed for 35 months because of the COVID-19 pandemic. It came a day after Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Center (CPN-MC) Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal, a.k.a. Prachanda, assumed the premiership. These appear to be “goodwill” gestures from China to the new communist leader in Nepal.

The dream of a railroad linking Nepal to China is an old one. King Birendra Shah and Chairman Mao Zedong mooted the idea in 1973.

Landlocked Nepal’s connectivity with the rest of the world is through India. This has been a source of frustration for the Nepali public and policymakers as it has made Nepal very dependent on India. The railroad to China offers Nepal a way to break its India-lockedness and provides it with alternative access to the rest of the world. Also, there is an increasing need for better connectivity, given the expanding trade volume between the two countries. It was after the Indian economic blockade on Nepal in 2015 that Nepal and China accelerated their efforts on making the railway project a reality.

Then-Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Oli signed an agreement in 2018 during his visit to China. In April 2019, China included the Nepal-China Trans-Himalayan Multidimensional Connectivity Network in Beijing’s joint communiqué of the second Belt and Road Forum. The two countries signed an MoU on the feasibility study of the proposed railway during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Nepal in October 2019. Xi said the connectivity network would help Nepal “transform from a landlocked country to a land-linked country.” For China, the vision is a part of Xi’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative.

The proposed rail will connect to the Lasha-Shigatse railway in Tibet. On the other side of the border, the rail could be expanded to connect Pokhara and Lumbini, two other major cities in Nepal.

The railroad offers hope and has significant potential. It will symbolize the Nepali dream of better infrastructure and economic connectivity and represent good Nepal-China relations. Strategically, railway connectivity with China diversifies Nepal’s connectivity and reduces dependence upon India. It will ensure Nepal will suffer minimal consequences if India imposes a blockade in the future. Economically, it will facilitate trade with China. Supporters also point out that the railroad could be instrumental in bringing a large number of tourists from China to Nepal.

However, obstacles aplenty remain. First, the railroad has to transverse the mighty Himalayas. The terrain and ecology are challenging. China has shown that it can build a railroad in a complex landscape. However, the trans-Himalayan railroad will test Chinese abilities. Almost 98 percent of the railroad will either be a bridge or tunnel because of the terrain.

Second, the cost of the railroad is a primary concern. Previous estimates put the cost at $3 billion. However, it is expected to now cost around $8 billion (to link up to Shigatse). We will have a more accurate estimate after the feasibility study. There is a high chance of the cost being revised upwards. It will be a massive commitment for Nepal, whose GDP is around $30 billion.

Third, China has provided a grant for the feasibility study, estimated to cost around $300 million. However, it will be loans that will likely fund the implementation of the project. There is a fear that Nepal could go the Sri Lankan way if Nepal undertakes such loans without due diligence. The Nepali media is abuzz with apprehensions over the “debt trap,” citing what transpired in Hambantota port in Sri Lanka. The Nepali ambassador to China has sought to dissuade such concerns, but it will not be easy.

Fourth, some are concerned that the railway does not benefit Nepal. Nepal’s trade with China amounted to NRs 235 billion ($1.8 billion) in 2020/21. However, Nepal’s exports accounted for a paltry NRs 1 billion ($8 million). With a 1:234 export-to-import ratio, trains running will carry Chinese goods to Nepali markets but can be expected to return empty. Therefore, the railroad could only increase Nepal’s imports from China.

Fifth, India sees the Himalayas as its natural defense frontier and the region south of the Himalayas as its sphere of influence. It could see the railroad as China broaching India’s security perimeter. India was not pleased when Nepal signed the BRI agreement in 2017.

Talks of a railroad connecting Nepal to China has had India on its toes. In recent years, Nepal and India have upgraded and expanded the dysfunctional Janakpur-Jayanagar railway to Kurtha. In April, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and then Nepali Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba jointly flagged the cross-border railway service between Jayanagar (India) to Kurtha. The 35-km-long railway was built with an Indian grant worth NRs 10 billion ($75 million). In addition, work is underway to expand the road to Bardibas via Bijalpura. This is one of the five cross-border links being talked about between Nepal and India.

Nepal has its task cut out. Firstly, it needs to do a cost-benefit analysis in conjugation with the financing modality. If the current trade trend continues, the benefit to Nepal will be minimal. Meanwhile, Kathmandu needs to engage New Delhi to communicate Nepal’s rationale and assure it that the railway will not affect Indian security interests. Nepal needs connectivity with both neighbors, and it is not a competition. Also, Nepal needs to harmonize infrastructure development to its northern border with China and its southern border with India to support Nepal’s growth.

India builds a broader gauge railway, and China, a standard gauge. It will be a challenge for Nepal to find a way to make the railway tracks built in collaboration with the two countries interoperable. This will be a major test of Nepal’s diplomacy.

– SANTOSH Sharma Poudel

The column originally appeared in The Diplomat on 27 December 2022. Please read the original article here.

This year’s Christmas brought a “surprise” in Nepal. Pushpa Kamal Dahal, the chairman of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Centre (CPN-MC), which won only 32 seats in the 275-member lower house of parliament in the recent general election, was appointed prime minister after he secured the support of seven parties, including the party led by arch-rival Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli of the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML).

Sher Bahadur Deuba, who believes that he is destined to be the prime minister of Nepal seven times and was expecting to be the premier for the sixth time, was left out to dry, although his party, the Nepali Congress (NC), won the largest number of seats.

The timely election and selection of the prime minister is an achievement for Nepal’s nascent democratic process. Yet, the formation of the government reeks of a democratic deficit. CPN-MC, which stood a distant third and won only 11 percent of the votes, will lead a government that excludes the largest party. Nepal’s parties have ignored the “mandate of the people.”

As expected, the November 20 election produced a fractured result. The NC emerged as the largest party, winning 89 seats in the federal parliament. CPN-UML, CPN-MC, the National Independent Party (NIP), and the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) rounded off the top five, winning 78, 32, 20, and 14 seats, respectively. The newly-elected parliamentarians took the oath of office on December 22.

Parties had jostled for electoral alliances before the elections. Two major alliances contested the polls: a five-party ruling coalition led by the NC, which included Dahal’s CPN-MC, and the opposition coalition led by the CPN-UML. As the election results started to pour in, leaders of political parties engaged in negotiations on government formation. Deuba was confident that the ruling coalition would endure. Dahal repeated the same in public until he made a volte-face at the eleventh hour on December 25.

Primarily, two parties were vocal about their claim to lead the government: NC and CPN-MC. Within the NC, Deuba was challenged by a young leader, Gagan Thapa. While Gagan Thapa remains popular among the general populace and represents the change of generation from the old to young leaders, Deuba has a significant numerical advantage within the NC. Thus, the NC elected Deuba as the leader of the parliamentary party, who is also the party’s prime ministerial candidate, over Thapa by 64-29 votes. Meanwhile, the CPN-MC selected Dahal unopposed.

With this, the contest narrowed down to one between Deuba and Dahal. The two leaders had agreed to take turns leading the government, but neither was willing to concede the chance to lead the government first. Deuba felt he had the natural claim to the leadership first because his party was the largest by a mile, and he was confident that Dahal and Oli would not get back together. Dahal claimed it was his turn after Deuba led the government from 2021 to 2022.

Meanwhile, Dahal was engaging Oli’s CPN-UML through his trusted lieutenants. Oli was waiting in the wings to drive a wedge in the ruling coalition.ADVERTISEMENT

The president invited leaders to claim premiership with majority support by December 25. Deuba was steadfast in his claim of the premiership as the day loomed. Then, Dahal left the coalition and indicated his ditching of the alliance, saying it had “lost its relevance.”

The next day, Dahal received the support of the seven parties, including the CPN-UML, to become the prime minister for the third time. So it is déjà vu, and 2017 again, though the left parties have weakened significantly and needed support from newer parties.

Politics has created strange bedfellows in Nepal in the past. However, this coalition trumps them all.

Besides the CPN-MC and CPN-UML, the coalition includes the four-month-old NIP, the conservative RPP, Madhes-based Janata Samjbadi Party-Nepal (JSP-N) and Janamat Party (JP), and ethnic Nagarik Unmukti Party (NUP) as well as three independent members of the parliament.

Among the coalition partners, the CPN-MC and the CPN-UML largely share common agenda. They were instrumental in introducing federalism and making Nepal a secular state. However, Oli has has indicated his aversion to federalism and secularism in recent times. At a personal level, Oli and Dahal share a tumultuous relationship.

If the two communist parties are from Venus, other coalition partners are from Mars. NIP ran on a “no, not again” platform, attempting to usurp anti-establishment votes. NIP’s leader, Rabi Lamichhane, had said that he would not be a part of any government led by the establishment leaders. The RPP ran on the agenda of reviving constitutional monarchy and the Hindu state. NIP and RPP seek to undo the provincial structure. JP contested against the JSP-N, accusing the latter of ignoring the Madhesi people’s issues in their lust for power. NUP ran on an anti-establishment platform, arguing that the Tharu community in the mid-Terai needed to be freed from the establishment’s control.

The coalition partners have come together in their lust for power. There is bare-knuckle bargaining going on for ministerial portfolios and other political appointments, including in provinces. It can be seen in Lamichhane’s appointment as the deputy prime minister and home minister. There is a court petition against Lamichhane, a Nepali citizen-turned U.S. citizen-turned Nepali citizen, regarding his citizenship. Yet, he now leads the ministry which issues the citizenship certificate. It symbolizes that the coalition is devoid of ethics too.’

Given the breadth of the coalition, Dahal’s focus will be to maintain his hold on power. He will lead the government for at least two years, for the constitution mandates that a no-confidence motion cannot be introduced against a prime minister for two years. However, we can expect a revolving door for the ministerial portfolios. The council of ministers will likely report to their party leaders, not necessarily to the prime minister, weakening the government. It will be a huge miracle if there is a smooth transfer of power to Oli after two years. It will not be a surprise if a new coalition emerges then.

China and India quickly offered “warm congratulations” to the new Prime Minister.

Some Indian analysts believed New Delhi was readying to welcome Deuba as the prime minister. Others, such as former Indian envoy to Nepal Ranjit Roy, had expressed the need for India to engage all parties, big and small. Nepal’s relations with India had normalized under the Deuba-government after it had hit a new low during Oli’s tenure over Nepal’s new map in 2020.

New Delhi is not very fond of Dahal. In its early stages, his party called India an “expansionist” force. He has accused New Delhi of orchestrating his ouster from prime ministership in 2008 and insinuated that New Delhi plotted to kill him. However, he has changed his tune in recent times. During his visit to New Delhi earlier this year, he visited the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) headquarters. He met with many senior leaders although Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi snubbed him. However, New Delhi still considers Dahal unreliable.

Meanwhile, China could not have been happier at the moment. China had nudged CPN-MC and CPN-UML for a communist unification in 2017 and had tried its best to keep the unified Nepal Communist Party (NCP) together when it was on the verge of splitting at the end of 2020. Beijing was less engaged this time but will cheer the communist-plus coalition.

Deuba, known in Beijing as a pro-India leader, cold shouldered the Belt and Road Initiative, a pet project of Chinese leader Xi Jinping, arguing that he prefers grants to loans. Deuba led the ratification of the $500 million American grant, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), despite vocal Chinese opposition. He has been wary of the Chinese Communist Party as it has invested in party-to-party relations with Nepal’s communist parties.

Dahal shares a better relationship with Nepal’s northern neighbor. His fondness for China will be of concern to the U.S. American engagement in Nepal has increased tremendously in recent years and could slow down during Dahal’s term.

However, Dahal has been pragmatic, if unimaginative, about Nepal’s relations with the two neighbors and the U.S. He has been in politics and power long enough to understand the importance of all three major powers and their interests in Nepal. Therefore, we may not see any significant turn in foreign policy like he frequently does in national politics.

In saying that, the new government has a gamut of issues that require immediate attention. The Deuba-led government had put off the difficult decision on the Agnipath scheme of recruiting soldiers in India. Dahal will have to deal with that controversial issue now. Border disputes with India and China need his immediate attention too. The most pressing will be how Nepal engages India, China, and the U.S. amidst the Sino-Indian regional tension and the Sino-American global tussle. It will also be the issue with the most far-reaching consequences for Nepal’s security.

Dahal has shown his Machiavellian nature to grab leadership at home. We will find out if he can pull out a “surprise” in Nepal’s foreign policy.