– SANTOSH SHARMA POUDEL

The column originally appeared in The Diplomat on 31 July 2023. Please read the original article here.

Nepal is engaged in a fierce debate about rightsizing its army.

Statements by two members of parliament ignited the debate. On June 20, parliamentarian Swarnim Waglé warned that Nepal is headed to a disaster if the “difficult” decision of rightsizing the military is not taken. Citing the reduction of troops in Sri Lanka in the wake of the economic crisis, the Rashtriya Swatantra Party MP said that Nepal did not need 90,000 troops.

Ten days later, former Foreign Minister Bimala Rai Poudyal questioned the utility of a large troop force during peacetime. She argued that the risk of a physical attack on Nepal from the neighboring countries was low and pointed out that even if they did attack, the Nepali Army could not win against them.

The statements triggered a furor on social and traditional media. Following criticism from the public and senior retired military personnel, the two clarified or toned down their statements. Waglé conceded that “whatever is done should be done with the consent of the security agencies.” Similarly, Poudyal explained that she was merely “seeking an answer from the government and defense minister whether we need the current size of Nepal Army.”

Defense Minister Purna Bahadur Khadka has clarified that there is no plan to reduce the army’s size.

The argument for downsizing the military is often based on the economic costs of maintaining the 96,000-strong force, although Poudyal denied making such an argument.

Nepal allocated 58.84 billion Nepali rupees ($450 million), accounting for 3.5 percent of the total government expenditure for 2023-24.

As the graph below shows, the military budget, as a proportion of government expenditure, increased significantly since 2001, when the Nepal Army was mobilized to counter the Maoist insurgency. It reached its peak in 2005 and has declined consistently since. Nepal’s military expenditure, whether measured as a proportion of government expenditure or GDP, is below the world average. Thus, there is little economic rationale for downsizing the budget of the defense agency or troop size to cut costs.

However, the Nepal Army spends 90 percent of its allocated budget on recurrent expenditure and only 9.6 percent on capital expenditure. This is more worrying, for it means that the Nepal Army is investing less in the future. Any downsizing of the military, without reducing the overall budget, would free a larger share of the budget for the military to invest in modern technologies for the future.

The size of the army also becomes an issue because of the expanding footprint of the military into non-core areas, such as the construction of infrastructure and even business ventures. As a result, the army has become sluggish regarding combat readiness and deployment.

Hence, the debate is not about merely downsizing to cut costs but professionalizing the military.

The more pertinent question raised by Poudyal relates to the overall “utility” of the military. Citing repeated instances of border encroachment, she alleged that the army has failed in its primary role: to protect Nepal’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Poudyal pointed out that Nepal’s army would not be able to withstand any war with neighboring countries.

Given China and India’s relative size and power, such an assumption may sound logical. Nevertheless, analyzing the role of the military in such stark terms is a gross misunderstanding and reductive. The military’s role is not just to win wars but to thwart such attacks before they happen and defend the territory if attacked.

A look at what is unfolding in Ukraine, where a relatively more minor force has been able to withstand attacks from a larger and wealthier country, gives a broader understanding of the role of the military.

Issues including the nature and the role of the military should be debated. However, ensuring that such debate is proper and not disparaging to the force that is ultimately responsible for the nation’s security is also essential.

Equally concerning is the nature of the backlash received by the parliamentarians and the defensiveness of the army.

Poudyal’s social media was flooded with comments about her being a sellout, an agent of a foreign country, or taking up the issue to weaken the military.

As a parliamentarian in a country where the army operates under civilian rule, she has every right and responsibility to debate the military’s size and role. Such debate is overdue. The size of Nepal’s military almost doubled during the Maoist insurgency, increasing from 45,000 to 96,000 now. Now that the domestic political context has changed, as have the regional and global dynamics, there should be a corresponding debate on the role and security strategy of the country.

Therefore, the defensiveness of the military force is worrying.

In March, Army Chief General Prabhu Ram Sharma dismissed the calls for downsizing by “self-proclaimed academics, experts, and security experts working in non-governmental organizations and international non-governmental organizations.” He called them “outsiders” working at the behest of foreign powers. Now, the military has responded quietly, saying that the government determines the army’s size based on the needs.

However, retired military officials have taken up the mantle of counterpunch.

Former Army Chief General Gaurav S.J.B. Rana slammed the calls for downsizing the military as “undeveloped” and “unschooled opinion.” Stating that the military is a valuable asset of the state to be cherished, Rana insisted that the “process to determine the size, composition, and capabilities of the military is best left to the military professionals, under the stewardship of the government.”

Meanwhile, another retired army chief, General Binoj Basnyat, called for doing away with the costly federal system, among others, to bring in enough resources required for national development.

Besides, both Rana and Basnyat point out that the military remains the most trusted institution in the country and, thus, should not be questioned.

As per a survey, 91.2 percent of Nepali people trusted the military, compared to 44 percent who trusted political parties. Therefore, they argue that the army is a far more responsible actor and absolved of any public debate.

Their comments imply that the Nepal Army should not be questioned. Indeed, parliamentarians are also cautious when talking about the military. Poudyal said that she was discouraged by senior leaders of different parties from talking about the military issues a few days after her statement caused public fury.

In saying that, there are commonalities between those seeking a debate on the army’s role and those defensive about any discussion. Both understand that regional and global geopolitical currents are changing rapidly; a war between two countries, seen as unlikely over the past few decades, has become a reality today.

Such geopolitical changes have thrust Nepal into the center of regional and global geopolitical tussles. Together with the changed domestic security context, a discussion of security strategy and the military’s corresponding size, shape, and form is much needed. The Nepali military of 2005 will not be able to meet the challenges of today.

However, when civilian leaders debate the size and role of the military, the military understands it as “downsizing,” making it defensive.

Therefore, the first step is bridging the trust gap between the civilian and military leadership. Then both sides can sit together and rationally chart the way appropriate for the current and future needs of the country and reform the military as per need.

– SANTOSH Sharma Poudel

The column originally appeared in The Diplomat on 18 April 2023. Please read the original article here.

Kathmandu has been abuzz with discussion about Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s visit to India. Initially planned for April, the visit has been postponed now to early May.

Since his swearing-in as Nepal’s prime minister in late December of last year, Dahal has publicly stated his interest in making New Delhi his first foreign destination. He has repeated this intention time and again.

Nepal’s prime ministers have traditionally chosen New Delhi for their first foreign trip. Dahal was the last prime minister to buck the trend when he assumed the role of prime minister for the first time in 2008. Then, he visited Beijing to attend the Olympics closing ceremony, drawing criticism at home and in New Delhi for flying first to Nepal’s northern neighbor, China.

India is so central in Nepal’s diplomacy and domestic politics that the first visit of a Nepali prime minister to New Delhi is assumed.

While newly appointed Nepali prime ministers often rush to visit India, New Delhi has not always shown similar urgency to meet them. Dahal’s immediate predecessor, former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba, had to wait nine months before he could visit India. Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli, who preceded Deuba, got to visit the Indian capital within two months after he became the premier. During his last tenure as prime minister (2016-17) Dahal got to visit New Delhi four months after he took over the reins.

India rushed to welcome Oli in 2018 because it wanted to rebuild ties with Kathmandu that had been severely strained by its blockade of landlocked Nepal in 2015. It also saw Oli as a powerful leader, potentially at the helm of the Nepali government for five years. New Delhi was proactive in seeking to ensure that Oli would not lean to Beijing as he did during his previous tenure (2015-16). Besides, the Indian government wanted to project successful diplomacy in its neighborhood.

What explains the delay in Dahal’s visit to New Delhi?

First, since becoming prime minister Dahal has spent his entire energy managing and surviving domestic politics. In the last four months, he has changed coalition partners and is yet to form a government fully. After the Oli-led Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) withdrew from the government, Dahal was in charge of 16 ministerial portfolios, including foreign affairs. He finally appointed N.P. Saud of the Nepali Congress (NC) as the foreign minister on April 16. It is not a surprise then that without a lieutenant on his side, Dahal’s diplomatic plans suffered. The cabinet expansion is expected to be complete soon, so he can finally glance beyond domestic politics.

Second, Dahal’s grip over power appears tenuous. His party, the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Centre (CPN-MC) came in a distant third in the 2022 general elections, winning a mere 11 percent of the votes. While he was able to play on the insecurities of Deuba and Oli to propel himself to the prime minister’s post, his alliance with the Oli-led CPN-UML was a partnership of strange bedfellows, one that was doomed to fail given their past tumultuous relations and the fact that Dahal had a pre-poll alliance with the Deuba-led NC. With the NC actively looking to wedge them apart, the coalition soon fell. New Delhi might have calculated that there was little to gain from the visit of a flailing prime minister. India was therefore not in a hurry to meet Dahal.

Finally, five months after the general elections, Nepali politics look somewhat settled by Nepali standards. Hence, diplomacy, and the trip to New Delhi, is back among the priorities for the Dahal government.

Several outstanding issues in India-Nepal relations require immediate attention.

Among the primary concerns for Nepal is the connectivity: land, air, and power. The detailed project report for the 136-km-long Raxaul-Kathmandu broad-gauge railway is complete. India and Nepal will be holding a meeting of the joint working group on the railway project this week and expect to sign an agreement on the construction and funding modality during Dahal’s upcoming visit.

Nepal has been seeking Indian permission for air routes to efficiently operate the Gautam Buddha International Airport (GBIA) and Pokhara International Airport (both of which, incidentally, were built by Chinese firms). Nepal has requested India to provide three additional entry routes and an agreement on near-border operation for the GBIA to make international flights to the newly built airports economically feasible. Dahal would like to secure agreements for at least two entry points.

The two countries signed a Joint Vision Statement on Power Sector Cooperation during Deuba’s visit to New Delhi in 2022. Cross-border power transmission infrastructure and bi-directional power trade based on market demand are core components of the agreement. Based on it, India has permitted Nepal to export up to 364 MW of hydroelectricity. Nepal seeks to expand the scope and depth of the agreement. It seeks further Indian investment in hydroelectricity, permission for more energy exports to India, and Indian cooperation for exporting hydroelectricity produced in Nepal to Bangladesh via India.

The two neighbors had a fallout over the Agnipath scheme introduced last year. Under the scheme, the Indian Army recruits young soldiers (Agniveers) for four years, after which three in four Agniveers will retire from the Army with a $15,000 severance package. This goes against the 1947 tripartite agreement Nepal signed with India and the United Kingdom, which requires India and the U.K. to provide pensions to the Gurkha soldiers recruited from Nepal. As a result of the spat with India on the matter, India’s recruitment of Gurkhas from Nepal has been postponed since last year. Nepal would seek an amicable solution during the visit.

Besides these concerns, there are other stock issues, such as the territorial dispute along Nepal’s western border with India, border management, and a host of other economic issues to be dealt with. On top of that, the Dahal government will have to allay New Delhi’s apprehensions over Nepal’s increased engagement of Beijing and Washington. It will have to assure New Delhi that these engagements will not come at the cost of legitimate Indian interests in Nepal. These issues make Dahal’s visit to New Delhi in May critical.

Reports say that the visit dates have been finalized but will only be disclosed once some agendas get a concrete shape. Sherpas from both countries are working on the draft of the final agreement to be signed in New Delhi.

Dahal has shown his Machiavellian traits to become the premier. We will find out soon if he is any good at diplomacy.

– SANTOSH Sharma Poudel

The column originally appeared in The Diplomat on 16 January 2023. Please read the original article here.

Nepali politics continues to confound observers. Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Center (CPN-MC) chief Pushpa Kamal Dahal, who was sworn in as prime minister on December 26 despite his party standing third in the recent general elections, received a strong but surprising boost in a trust vote in parliament on January 10 when his former electoral alliance partners, the Sher Bahadur Deuba-led Nepali Congress (NC) and the Madhav Kumar Nepal-led Communist Party of Nepal-United Socialist (CPN-US), voted in support of his new government.

Less than a fortnight ago, Dahal ditched the NC and CPN-US to head a government with support from the Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli-led Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML). NC and CPN-US backed Dahal in the confidence vote despite his last-minute betrayal.

The decision of the NC and CPN-US to support Dahal has become the topic of much discussion in Nepal. Some speculate that Deuba might have supported Dahal in an attempt to secure a share in the spoils of power. Others see Deuba’s move as aimed at driving a wedge between Dahal and Oli. Meanwhile, others see it as a shrewd move by Dahal to minimize Oli’s influence in the ruling coalition. Whatever the reason, it is evident that instrumentalism determines Nepali politics, and that gaining power is the only currency.

The ruling coalition comprises parties with diverse interests and political goals. Its survival and domestic issues will be Prime Minister Dahal’s primary focus. Speeches of leaders in the new parliament focused on domestic issues like good governance, political stability, corruption control, and effective implementation of federalism.

Coalition partners wield considerable leverage in the new government and Oli, who heads the largest party in this coalition, will exercise significant control. He leads the mechanism to support the government and develop a common minimum program for the coalition government. His leverage will increase if the presidency or the house speakership (or both) go to the CPN-UML. Dahal seems to be in for a rough ride.

Meanwhile, several issues on the foreign policy front deserve Dahal’s immediate attention. The need for Nepal to “balance” its engagement with the big powers – India, the U.S., and China – in the context of heightened Sino-Indian and Sino-U.S. competition while maintaining strategic autonomy and sovereignty will be a major challenge. Another is Nepal’s widening trade deficit. Such challenges have intensified in recent times.

Dahal will need to tackle several issues with India. Firstly, he will need to decide on India’s Agnipath scheme. The previous government, of which Dahal’s party was a coalition partner, kicked the Agnipath can down the road for the next government to deal with. The Agnipath scheme provides for short-term recruitment into the Indian Army, which violates the tripartite agreement between Nepal, Great Britain and India regarding the recruitment of Nepali Gurkhas into the Indian and British armies. Last year, such recruitment in Nepal was suspended because Kathmandu was opposed to the short-term recruitment of Nepalis into the Indian Army. The current government does not have the luxury of delaying a decision on the matter as Gurkha recruitment from Nepal, which has been a critical element in Indo-Nepal relations, is in jeopardy.

Secondly, Nepal needs New Delhi’s cooperation to export hydroelectricity to Bangladesh. In August last year, Nepal and Bangladesh decided to request India to allow the export of 40-50 MW of Nepali hydropower to Bangladesh as Nepal needs to use the Indian grid (via Indian territory) to export electricity to Bangladesh.

When Nepali officials raised the issue during the recent Power Summit organized by the Confederation of Indian Industries on grid connectivity in the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Indian officials said that the Baharampur-Bheramara line connecting Nepal to Bangladesh was “fully occupied.” Therefore, the issue will test Dahal’s diplomatic skills.

Thirdly, Nepal has requested that India grant air entry points to facilitate aircraft movement to Bhairahawa and Pokhara. The two airports were built by Chinese companies, though the former was funded by the Asian Development Bank. Without India granting appropriate entry points, airplanes will need to circle in Nepal for a few minutes before landing, increasing operational costs. Kathmandu should engage India at the earliest to ensure the international airports are sustainable for airlines to use.

Fourthly, Dahal needs to continue the “return to normalcy” in India-Nepal relations after its nadir in 2020, when the Oli government amended the Nepali map to include Kalapani, Limpiyadhura, and Lipulekh in the far west – territories also claimed by India.

There are also issues with China that require immediate attention. One is China’s opening of the Kerung border point. This was closed with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic but was reopened after Dahal assumed the premiership recently. There are concerns in Nepal over the reopening of this border point amid the surge in COVID-19 cases in China.

Nepal needs clarity on its position on Global Security Initiative (GSI), a Chinese initiative to counter rival regional blocs such as the Quad. Beijing is keen for Nepal to join the GSI. Although Nepal has clarified its commitment to non-alignment, which would mean Nepal will not join any security pacts with any country, President Bidhya Devi Bhandari joined the GSI meeting last year despite the Deuba-led government’s reservations.

Also, Beijing is impatient to see projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) take off in Nepal. Days after Dahal’s appointment as prime minister, a Chinese delegation came to Nepal to conduct a feasibility study of the Kathmandu-Kerung railway connectivity. With a friendlier government in power, Beijing would like to see BRI projects make concrete progress.

Whether Dahal makes New Delhi or Beijing the destination of his first foreign visit will be keenly watched. However, it will be pragmatic if he were to pick New Delhi first, ceteris paribus. As much as his visit to Beijing would show that he is attempting to balance between Nepal’s two giant neighbors, which every leader in Nepal professes and which is the official foreign policy, the fact is that Nepal has more issues that require immediate engagement with its southern neighbor.

Kathmandu is abuzz with speculation that New Delhi wanted Deuba, not Dahal, to lead the new government. However, despite New Delhi’s suspicions of Dahal and Dahal’s earlier misgivings regarding New Delhi, Nepal needs healthy relations with India. He might get a warmer welcome in Beijing than in New Delhi. Yet, a visit to New Delhi will show his intent to tackle difficult issues head-on, not shy away from them.

In this context, his decision to make New Delhi the first port of call, likely to be in late February or early March, is a mature decision. He has the experience of engaging India as prime minister and has a host of immediate and enduring issues on his plate. His level of success in resolving those issues will determine his legacy.

– NISCHAL Dhungel* and ABIJIT SHARMA

Dhungel is a non-resident fellow at NIPoRe. The opinion piece originally appeared in The Kathmandu Post on 18 January 2023. Please read the original article here.

With the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war, foreign relations trembled among major economic powers. While condemning Russia’s aggression and barraging the country with a series of sanctions, the West expected India to follow suit. However, New Delhi adopted studied public neutrality and abstained from successive votes condemning the Russian move in the UN Security Council, General Assembly, and Human Rights Council. Just like India, China maintained relative neutrality, with a solid foreign policy stance in response to the conflict. Despite its closeness with Russia, Beijing stopped short of supporting it in the war. It also stopped short of calling Russia the aggressor and abstained from a United Nations Security Council vote denouncing the ‘invasion’. Beijing and New Delhi had made their decision loud and clear. And they were not going to listen to anybody.

Assertive New Delhi

Speaking at the Globsec 2022 forum in Slovakia, Minister of External Affairs of India, Dr S Jaishankar laid clear India’s increasingly confident foreign policy. “Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems,” Jaishankar said. He criticised the West for hoarding vaccines, which impacted the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). It is crucial to understand how India came to this position, which was unimaginable until a few years ago.

India’s political, social and economic fabric had been damaged after 200 years of colonialism. Its foreign policy could not remain untouched. Following independence, New Delhi slowly started to chart its own path, pursuing different strategic approaches from 1946 to 2013. Nehruvian influence persisted from 1946 to 62, an era of strategic non-alignment amidst US-Soviet Union rivalry. From 1962 to 1971, considered the decade of realism and recovery, India made pragmatic choices in national security and political challenges despite a lack of resources. The country went through a complex phase from 1971 to 1991 as the US-China-Pakistan axis came up. From 1991 to 1999, it had challenges in retaining its strategic autonomy in a unipolar world, whereas from 2000 to 2013, India focused on balancing power.

But since assuming office in 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made an unprecedented transformation of Indian foreign policy. Modi has put India as an emerging superpower on the map and sought to engage rather than remain ‘non-aligned actively’. New Delhi now understands that it deals with multiple global complexities, making decisions based on calculated risk-taking. As a result, India is slowly standing out, drifting away from strategic ambiguity to strategic freedom and taking a solid foreign policy stance on international fora. This is a significant departure from the older ‘non-alignment’ tenet that had long established India’s typical social values and norms, at least in foreign relations.

India’s central foreign policy tenet under Modi is seen to be guided by the Eastern principle of ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’, which translates to “the world is one family”. This was evident during the Covid-19 pandemic when New Delhi delivered more than 100 million doses to countries in Asia and Africa. While Modi has spearheaded this new brand of foreign policy, his bureaucrats and ministers have helped implement it. In 2015, just two days before his retirement, the Narendra Modi government appointed a highly agile foreign service officer, a foreign ambassador to the US and China, to the position of foreign secretary. Jaishankar has been the flag bearer of Modi’s foreign policy ever since Modi’s second term in office. Jaishankar openly admits India’s shortcomings and stays committed to securing its national interest with/without taking any sides.

‘Wolf-warrior’ in Beijing

Coinciding with India’s assertive stance in global politics is China’s equally aggressive stance, especially against the West. The Chinese foreign policy has been so assertive and aggressive in recent years that it has earned a new name: ‘Wolf-warrior’. While aggressive Chinese rhetoric might appear quite normal now, it is a shift from China’s earlier foreign policy. And the man to bring about this shift is none other than Xi Jinping. At heart, Xi’s diplomacy calls for a more active role for China as a great power on the world stage, including reforming the Western-dominated international order and creating what China calls “true multilateralism”.

When the architect of China’s economic reform, Deng Xiaoping, came to power following Mao Zedong’s death in the late 1970s, he prescribed a foreign policy which was subtle and cooperative. His approach focused on “biding one’s time without revealing one’s strength”. As a result, in the 1980s and 90s, Beijing was focused on “securing position, coping with affairs calmly and hiding capacities”. The leaders who came to power after Deng continued the policy.

But Xi’s ascendance since 2012 has slowly changed things in Beijing. Far from “biding time and hiding strengths”, it is now focused on making its stance clear on the global stage. Most importantly, it is open to show its strength. Take, for instance, its recent response to the Taiwan issue. Just before the then US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited the island in August last year, the Chinese President issued a stern warning to his American counterpart, allegedly saying that “… those who play with fire would perish by it”. When its alarm went unheeded, the Chinese military launched targeted military exercises.

Xi’s ambitions to help China regain its glory of the Middle Kingdom years have been evident since he took office. Upon gaining power in 2012, he immediately identified “national rejuvenation” as his primary goal. The ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was announced a year later. At the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi stated that China would no longer shy away from world leadership and efforts shaping the international order. The BRI is an important example of how China has pursued its foreign policy interest. The initiative has 147 signatories and includes US allies and partners such as Saudi Arabia, Greece and UAE.

Quite naturally, the West has been critical of this stance, often saying that it might invite dangerous confrontations between China and the West. But Beijing has maintained that it is not the real aggressor but simply responding to Western threats. Defending China’s aggressive foreign policy, the then-Chinese Foreign Vice Minister Le Yucheng said last year that Beijing “had no choice but to fight back against constant ‘nagging’ and ‘insults’ from foreign critics”. Interestingly China has many flag bearers of this new assertive foreign policy, most notably the foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian. Zhao has had public spats with US diplomats and has been a vocal critic of the West.

If there is any lesson that Nepal should learn from its neighbours, it is that we need to pursue an independent foreign policy, especially in light of the geo-political games often played in the country.

– SANTOSH Sharma Poudel

The column originally appeared in The Diplomat on 30 December 2022. Please read the original article here.

On December 27, a team of Chinese experts landed in Nepal to conduct the feasibility study of the Kathmandu-Kerung (Geelong) railway. On the same day, China opened the Rasuwagadhi border point, which had remained closed for 35 months because of the COVID-19 pandemic. It came a day after Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Center (CPN-MC) Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal, a.k.a. Prachanda, assumed the premiership. These appear to be “goodwill” gestures from China to the new communist leader in Nepal.

The dream of a railroad linking Nepal to China is an old one. King Birendra Shah and Chairman Mao Zedong mooted the idea in 1973.

Landlocked Nepal’s connectivity with the rest of the world is through India. This has been a source of frustration for the Nepali public and policymakers as it has made Nepal very dependent on India. The railroad to China offers Nepal a way to break its India-lockedness and provides it with alternative access to the rest of the world. Also, there is an increasing need for better connectivity, given the expanding trade volume between the two countries. It was after the Indian economic blockade on Nepal in 2015 that Nepal and China accelerated their efforts on making the railway project a reality.

Then-Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Oli signed an agreement in 2018 during his visit to China. In April 2019, China included the Nepal-China Trans-Himalayan Multidimensional Connectivity Network in Beijing’s joint communiqué of the second Belt and Road Forum. The two countries signed an MoU on the feasibility study of the proposed railway during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Nepal in October 2019. Xi said the connectivity network would help Nepal “transform from a landlocked country to a land-linked country.” For China, the vision is a part of Xi’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative.

The proposed rail will connect to the Lasha-Shigatse railway in Tibet. On the other side of the border, the rail could be expanded to connect Pokhara and Lumbini, two other major cities in Nepal.

The railroad offers hope and has significant potential. It will symbolize the Nepali dream of better infrastructure and economic connectivity and represent good Nepal-China relations. Strategically, railway connectivity with China diversifies Nepal’s connectivity and reduces dependence upon India. It will ensure Nepal will suffer minimal consequences if India imposes a blockade in the future. Economically, it will facilitate trade with China. Supporters also point out that the railroad could be instrumental in bringing a large number of tourists from China to Nepal.

However, obstacles aplenty remain. First, the railroad has to transverse the mighty Himalayas. The terrain and ecology are challenging. China has shown that it can build a railroad in a complex landscape. However, the trans-Himalayan railroad will test Chinese abilities. Almost 98 percent of the railroad will either be a bridge or tunnel because of the terrain.

Second, the cost of the railroad is a primary concern. Previous estimates put the cost at $3 billion. However, it is expected to now cost around $8 billion (to link up to Shigatse). We will have a more accurate estimate after the feasibility study. There is a high chance of the cost being revised upwards. It will be a massive commitment for Nepal, whose GDP is around $30 billion.

Third, China has provided a grant for the feasibility study, estimated to cost around $300 million. However, it will be loans that will likely fund the implementation of the project. There is a fear that Nepal could go the Sri Lankan way if Nepal undertakes such loans without due diligence. The Nepali media is abuzz with apprehensions over the “debt trap,” citing what transpired in Hambantota port in Sri Lanka. The Nepali ambassador to China has sought to dissuade such concerns, but it will not be easy.

Fourth, some are concerned that the railway does not benefit Nepal. Nepal’s trade with China amounted to NRs 235 billion ($1.8 billion) in 2020/21. However, Nepal’s exports accounted for a paltry NRs 1 billion ($8 million). With a 1:234 export-to-import ratio, trains running will carry Chinese goods to Nepali markets but can be expected to return empty. Therefore, the railroad could only increase Nepal’s imports from China.

Fifth, India sees the Himalayas as its natural defense frontier and the region south of the Himalayas as its sphere of influence. It could see the railroad as China broaching India’s security perimeter. India was not pleased when Nepal signed the BRI agreement in 2017.

Talks of a railroad connecting Nepal to China has had India on its toes. In recent years, Nepal and India have upgraded and expanded the dysfunctional Janakpur-Jayanagar railway to Kurtha. In April, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and then Nepali Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba jointly flagged the cross-border railway service between Jayanagar (India) to Kurtha. The 35-km-long railway was built with an Indian grant worth NRs 10 billion ($75 million). In addition, work is underway to expand the road to Bardibas via Bijalpura. This is one of the five cross-border links being talked about between Nepal and India.

Nepal has its task cut out. Firstly, it needs to do a cost-benefit analysis in conjugation with the financing modality. If the current trade trend continues, the benefit to Nepal will be minimal. Meanwhile, Kathmandu needs to engage New Delhi to communicate Nepal’s rationale and assure it that the railway will not affect Indian security interests. Nepal needs connectivity with both neighbors, and it is not a competition. Also, Nepal needs to harmonize infrastructure development to its northern border with China and its southern border with India to support Nepal’s growth.

India builds a broader gauge railway, and China, a standard gauge. It will be a challenge for Nepal to find a way to make the railway tracks built in collaboration with the two countries interoperable. This will be a major test of Nepal’s diplomacy.

– SANTOSH Sharma Poudel

The column originally appeared in The Diplomat on 14 September 2022. Please read the original article here.

On June 14, India announced the Agnipath Scheme, a new model for recruitment into the Indian military. Under the scheme around 46,000 youth between 17.5 and 21 years of age will be recruited for service for a period of four years. A quarter of these recruits will be retained at the end of this period, while the rest will receive a severance package of approximately $15,000 and return to civilian life.

The goal of the Agnipath scheme is to make the Indian military “leaner, fitter and more youthful.” It is expected to cut ballooning salary payments and pension costs, which could be used to modernize the military. Despite countrywide protests India has moved ahead to recruit under the new scheme.

Upon announcing the scheme, the Indian Army wrote to Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, seeking approval to recruit Nepali nationals under the new plan. India’s Ministry of External Affairs confirmed that there would be no exception for Nepali Gurkhas.

Recruitment under the Agnipath scheme was to start on August 25 in Butwal and September 1 in Dharan in Nepal. However, the Nepali government halted recruitment.

Impressed by the valor displayed by Nepali Gurkha soldiers in the Anglo-Nepal War, the British East India Company started recruiting Nepali soldiers into a Gurkha regiment in 1815. Upon Indian independence, India, Nepal, and the British government signed a tripartite agreement whereby India would continue to recruit Gurkhas from Nepal.

Under the agreement, the countries would form exclusive Gurkha regiments, and recruits will be eligible for pensions. Currently, 34,000 Nepalis serve in the Indian Army, and 122,000 pensioners reside in Nepal. Cumulatively, they bring in $620 million (compared to Nepal’s defense budget of $420 million).

The recruitment of Nepali nationals in the Indian Army (and the British Army) is a contentious issue in Nepal. Some are opposed to it. Stopping the recruitment of Nepali soldiers in foreign militaries was one of the 40 demands raised by the Nepali Maoists when they started their 10-year armed insurgency. Even as recently as 2020, the Nepali government under Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli termed the 1947 tripartite agreement “redundant” and officially proposed its review, which the U.K. government declined.

Nepali nationals are raising several questions relating to the Agnipath scheme.

First, the scheme sidesteps the 1947 tripartite agreement. Although New Delhi has not rescinded the agreement per se it has been consistently stretching its understanding of the pact’s terms. The agreement provided a separate regiment of Nepali soldiers in the Indian Army and made provision for pensions. However, over time the Gurkha regiments in the Indian Army comprise fewer Nepali. They are now 60 percent Nepali, while the rest are ethnic Nepalis from various parts of India. The Agnipath scheme erases the pretense of a distinct Gurkha regiment, as all recruits will be Agniveers. The Agnipath scheme has direct bearing on Nepal and Nepali recruits. Yet India hardly consulted the Nepali government while devising the plan. It only sought Nepal’s approval after it had announced the scheme.

New Delhi often touts its “neighborhood first” policy. But it is increasingly taking Nepal for granted.

Second, retired and aspiring Gurkha soldiers in Nepal have criticized the short-term of the service under the Angipath scheme. For a long time, recruitment in the British or Indian Army was seen in Nepal as an economically secure job with high social status. Agnipath’s terms neither provide a long-term job nor financial security. Indian Agniveers will have priority access to jobs in government and elsewhere after four years. The Nepali government is unlikely to be able to provide such preference. On the contrary, “retired” Agniveers may not be able to join some government services or security forces because of their age upon completing four years of service.

Third, there are lingering concerns about rehabilitating the young “retirees” (who will be 22-23 years) into society. It will be a highly-trained and energetic cohort, potentially struggling to find a job or pay in Nepal. Therefore, there are risks of some of them joining armed groups operating in Nepal. After the Maoist insurgency was over, Nepal struggled to integrate the Maoist guerillas into society.

In addition, some foreign countries could take advantage of the trained forces for covert activities within Nepal. It could embroil Nepal further into the geostrategic nightmare, which could spiral out of control.

Gurkhas have a proud tradition of serving bravely and loyally in the Indian Army. The military of the two countries shares a close bond. As a result, the Chief of the Indian Army is accorded the status of an honorary chief in the Nepali Army and vice versa. Gurkha soldiers are a vital component of this special relationship.

In this context, many expected Nepal and India to have frank discussions on the issue and reach an agreement during the five-day visit of Indian Army General Manoj Pande earlier this month. However, the issue made no headway during his visit. Pande did not raise the matter during his meeting with Nepali Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba. Deuba’s foreign adviser Arun Subdei said Nepal is engaging India at diplomatic and political levels on the issue.

Going forward, Nepal has three options.

Firstly, it could argue that the relevance of the tripartite agreement is over and hence, seek a new form of negotiation with India at the bilateral level and halt the recruitment until a deal is reached. Secondly, it could approve recruitment under the Agnipath scheme. Finally, it could permanently stop all forms of recruitment of Nepalis into foreign militaries.

There is a need for extensive consultation within parties and across parties regarding these options. There are differing views even within parties, let alone the ruling coalition. Therefore, Nepal needs an extensive national debate on the conditions under which Nepal should allow its nationals to be recruited into a foreign military, if at all.

This affects the long-term security of Nepal and Indo-Nepal relations, and Kathmandu should not rush to a decision. With elections due in two months, the current government is unlikely to decide one way or the other. But the onus will likely be on the current top leadership even after the election.

– SAMJHANA Karki

The devastating earthquake on 25 April 2015, with a magnitude of 7.6 Richter Scale and hundreds of aftershocks, caused a significant impact on the lives of over eight million people across Nepal. The Post Disaster Needs Assessment, 2015, published by the National Planning Commission, reported more than 8,000 deaths and property damage worth approximately USD 7 billion.

Nepal ranks 11^th globally in terms of vulnerability to earthquakes. As soon as the news of the Nepal Earthquake broke, there was overwhelming commitment and subsequent support from the neighbouring countries, and India was the first to respond. It was reported that the then Nepali Prime Minister Sushil Koirala, who was in Bangkok, knew of the earthquake through the Indian Prime Minister’s tweet. India dispatched relief materials and rescue teams immediately.

The Indian government initiated Operation Maitri and launched a humanitarian mission, dispatched National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) teams and special aircraft with rescue and relief materials in Nepal. India released INR 96 crores (around 154 crore Nepali rupees) to Nepal for housing and school sector assistance. Under the post-earthquake reconstruction package, India allocated a grant of USD 250 million, including USD 50 million each for the education, cultural heritage, and health sector and USD 100 million for the housing sector.

When a crisis occurs, Nepal looks up to India. India, our closest neighbor, has always helped Nepal in the difficult hours. During this crisis, India provided immediate responses and timely decision-making. Furthermore, a swift emergency response was possible because of connected borders, friendly ties and institutional relations between the two nations. Close bilateral relations, including fraternal relations between the two countries’ militaries, provided the basis for swift support.

India experienced some hiccups during the support. Despite widespread help, Indian media faced a backlash for their insensitive reporting, which made the hashtag #GoHomeIndianMedia trend on Twitter. 

The India-imposed economic blockade towards the end of the year escalated the humanitarian crisis, though. Moreover, the blockade un-did the goodwill India had garnered from the support. It has left a long-lasting anti-India sentiment among the general populace. 

Disaster response is an additional dimension in Nepal-India relations. Other disasters such as floods affect both countries. They have established common mechanisms to deal with such issues, but their workings are unsatisfactory. It would benefit both countries to strengthen disaster cooperation, for it is less prone to conflict and garners goodwill for each other.

– JURIA SATO Bajracharya

Domestic efforts and existing bilateral treaties

Some notable initiatives are underway in Nepal. The Disaster Risk Reduction National Strategic Action Plan (2018-2030) proposes priority actions in the short-term (2018-2020), medium-term (2020-2025), and long-term (2025-2030), assigning responsibilities within federal, provincial, and local governments. In 2019, the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Authority was also established to coordinate, facilitate, and implement disaster risk reduction and management-related functions. Additionally, the Government of Nepal has developed an integrated and comprehensive one-stop Disaster Information Management System known as the Building Information Platform Against Disaster (BIPAD) portal, which is currently being localized.

On the bilateral front, while there have been several broad engagements around river management between Nepal and India, these have been limited. The two countries have often resorted to blaming one another for their shortcomings. There are different mechanisms to deal with flooding [for e.g. the secretary-level Joint Commission on Water Resources (JCWR), the Water and Energy Commission Secretariat (WECS) that deals with trans-boundary water issues, and the Joint Committee on Inundation and Flood Management (JCIFM)]. Sadly, these engagements have remained relatively passive. For instance, flood forecasting, which includes the planning and implementation of the Flood Forecasting Master Plan, was discussed consecutively in the JCIFM between 2014-2017, but this was left off the agenda in the 12th JCIFM in 2018. Similarly, the JCWR meetings are to be held once in six months, yet only seven meetings have taken place since its establishment in 2000. Dynamic and iterative engagement is key to addressing this issue, but cooperation on both ends has stalled over the years.

At the regional level, the SAARC Disaster Management Centre (SDMC), a dedicated body for disaster risk management, was established to build the capacities of South Asian nations and implement the Comprehensive Framework on Disaster Management for South Asia. In its power, the SDMC has developed regional guidelines, built a collective emergency response mechanism, and conducted several technical training sessions. However, the volume of such initiatives has decelerated over the past years. Despite having elements of an effective structure in place, emergency responses at the SAARC level have not been deployed in the wake of the multiple calamities in the region. As such, it has not been able to sustain a robust disaster management framework in ways that would enable member countries to build their national capacities and respond through concerted coordination. 

Shifting approach beyond the blame game

India and Nepal have long accused each other of the trans-border floods. Amidst the pandemic in 2020, the state government of Bihar blamed Nepal for obstructing flood preparedness activities. Nepal, on its part, has raised growing concerns over how Indian infrastructure and development activities along the Koshi and Gandaki rivers and along the border have hindered the natural flow of water. Progress is also compounded by the issue’s complex geographical and political nature and discontent among vested interest groups. Highlighting India’s hegemonic status in past water treaties with Nepal, many scholars have argued that treaties like the Koshi agreement (1954) and the Gandak agreement (1959) have deprived Nepal of its fair share of benefits. Decades have passed since these agreements, and any further passive leadership might impede timely action for collective and coordinated flood risk management efforts.

As we mark the 75th year of Nepal-India bilateral ties, leveraging this moment to gear focus towards the protection of lives and livelihood of the hardest hit climate-vulnerable communities – particularly in Bihar and Terai region – is crucial. Such cooperation will help further the bilateral relations and directly impact the lives and livelihood of people on both sides of the border. Formal government-to-government cooperation mechanisms for flood risk management efforts have been in place for decades with limited focus. Civil society actors, non-government organizations, and the private sector could play an increasingly important role in shifting the current narratives of transboundary disaster management negotiations. In the region, initiatives such as the Bangladesh-India Sundarbans Region Cooperative Initiative (BISRCI) have been helping the two governments manage the Sundarbans sustainably since 2011. In Nepal, the Koshi Disaster Risk Reduction Knowledge Hub (KDKH) is working to foster transboundary collaboration on disaster risk reduction and strengthen science, policy, and interlinkages. It has convened dialogue annually since its inception in 2018, bringing together researchers and policymakers to explore ways of collaboration. These initiatives play an important role as enablers in fostering bilateral dialogues and should be leveraged in furthering regional cooperation.

With climate change exacerbating extreme flood events every year, cooperation in disaster risk management will be increasingly critical to better Nepal-India relations. Climate contexts in both India and Nepal are characterized by the uncertainty of monsoon rain patterns, risks of melting Himalayan glaciers, and vulnerable low-lying coastal cities. Furthermore, losses from climate change in GDP per capita for both Nepal and India are projected to be higher than the global average of ~7 percent, with Nepal facing a potential loss of 13 percent and India ten percent in 2100.

Flooding during the monsoon season is a natural phenomenon. Nepal’s Terai region of Nepal and Eastern India face growing hazards from glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs) and bishyari floods, a type of flood that occurs due to the breaking of dams caused by landslides falling directly into rivers. Many rivers originate in the Himalayas and flow to the Bay of Bengal. Koshi, Gandaki, and Karnali rivers – the three largest river basins in Nepal – enter India through Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, the most populous states in India. Given the number of lakes at risk of bursting across these basins, the strong upstream-downstream flood linkages, the changing patterns of extreme precipitation events, and the cascading impacts on lives and livelihoods, cooperation in disaster risk reduction and management cannot be overlooked.

Vulnerability to flooding Despite increasing risks of devastating flood impacts annually, the momentum around cooperation tends to surface only during the monsoon season when more priority should ideally be directed towards rescue and rehabilitation. Nepal has already witnessed multiple damaging floods over the past decade – notably the Koshi flood of August 2008, one of the most disastrous floods affecting 3.5 million people across both countries. The tragedy exposed the inadequacy of current flood management systems and warned of the changing climate patterns. In recent years, Nepal has witnessed unseasonal heavy rains shortly after the monsoon in October 2021, a month that is crucial for agricultural harvests. The Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development estimated a loss of NPR 8.26 billion worth of paddy crops across all seven provinces only due to the unseasonal rain and flooding. Recent flooding patterns and climate change in the region indicate flooding is no longer a seasonal concern.

This series of Nepal-India relations blog posts are published on the auspicious occasion of India’s 75th Independence Celebration.

Domestic Updates

In late May, India announced a ban on wheat exports. New Delhi intended to secure the supplies for the nation amidst rampant inflation and a disrupted global supply chain caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. India accounts for just one percent of global exports and thus has only a regional impact. India banned the exports of sugar earlier. It has not yet banned rice exports and is considering exporting wheat to select regional nations.

India continues to face a slow but steady ‘fourth wave’ of the novel Coronavirus pandemic, with new cases climbing fast. The country counted over 4,000 new cases for the first time in the last three months. Amid the domestic crisis of the COVID-19 pandemic, India has earmarked USD 26 billion to curb rising prices and record inflation.

Regional Engagement

India has extended financial aid assistance to economically-decrepit Sri Lanka by deferring loans worth USD 1 billion. In addition, India sent energy supplies (diesel) to Sri Lanka. The economic downturn of the latter has led to political and social crises. As a result, Colombo lacked essentials such as food, fuel, and medicines in May.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Lumbini, the birthplace of Gautam Buddha in Nepal. Modi offered prayers at the sacred Maya Devi temple on the occasion of Buddha Purnima. India views Nepal from the prism of being within its geostrategic ambit and desires to reduce Chinese influence in Kathmandu.

India appointed ambassadors to Nepal and Bhutan in May. Following PM Modi’s visit to Nepal, the Ministry of External Affairs announced the appointment of Naveen Srivastava. He is known as a strong China hand and handled the East Asian Desk before being appointed Nepal ambassador. Ambassador to Bhutan appointee Sudhakar Dalela is also an old China hand. The appointments reflect New Delhi’s efforts indicate that China views its neighborhood from a security perspective and intends to counter Chinese influence in the region.

Global Engagement

Modi embarked upon a trip to Japan to attend the Quad Leaders’ Summit on 23 May. Modi spoke of India’s role in the maritime domain as the Quad made progress on maritime domain awareness (MDA). He described Quad as a ‘force for good’.

However, the Quad continues to remain divided on Russia. India is reluctant to criticize Russia, India’s time-tested strategic partner. Amid the ongoing conflict, India-Russia bilateral trade has witnessed an exponential rise. India is not just purchasing cheap oil from Russia but is also procuring other commodities such as fertilizers. Moscow is now the fourth-highest supplier of crude oil to New Delhi. As two major powers, India and Russia are consolidating their traditional partnership through an enhanced trade relationship that is only bound to grow. India also continues to have a different position in Moscow than the European Union. India’s Minister of External Affairs, S. Jaishankar, was quite critical of European hypocrisy over procuring oil from Russia to meet India’s needs. He said that Europe’s purchases of oil from Russia far outweigh India’s. However, the Quad is firmly united in its view of the global threat posed by rising Chinese influence.