24Sep2023

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Tag: Nepal Foreign Affairs

OP-EDs and Columns

Why Nepal Needs to Debate the Role of Its Army

– SANTOSH SHARMA POUDEL

The column originally appeared in The Diplomat on 31 July 2023. Please read the original article here.

Nepal is engaged in a fierce debate about rightsizing its army.

Statements by two members of parliament ignited the debate. On June 20, parliamentarian Swarnim Waglé warned that Nepal is headed to a disaster if the “difficult” decision of rightsizing the military is not taken. Citing the reduction of troops in Sri Lanka in the wake of the economic crisis, the Rashtriya Swatantra Party MP said that Nepal did not need 90,000 troops.

Ten days later, former Foreign Minister Bimala Rai Poudyal questioned the utility of a large troop force during peacetime. She argued that the risk of a physical attack on Nepal from the neighboring countries was low and pointed out that even if they did attack, the Nepali Army could not win against them.

The statements triggered a furor on social and traditional media. Following criticism from the public and senior retired military personnel, the two clarified or toned down their statements. Waglé conceded that “whatever is done should be done with the consent of the security agencies.” Similarly, Poudyal explained that she was merely “seeking an answer from the government and defense minister whether we need the current size of Nepal Army.”

Defense Minister Purna Bahadur Khadka has clarified that there is no plan to reduce the army’s size.

The argument for downsizing the military is often based on the economic costs of maintaining the 96,000-strong force, although Poudyal denied making such an argument.

Nepal allocated 58.84 billion Nepali rupees ($450 million), accounting for 3.5 percent of the total government expenditure for 2023-24.

As the graph below shows, the military budget, as a proportion of government expenditure, increased significantly since 2001, when the Nepal Army was mobilized to counter the Maoist insurgency. It reached its peak in 2005 and has declined consistently since. Nepal’s military expenditure, whether measured as a proportion of government expenditure or GDP, is below the world average. Thus, there is little economic rationale for downsizing the budget of the defense agency or troop size to cut costs.

However, the Nepal Army spends 90 percent of its allocated budget on recurrent expenditure and only 9.6 percent on capital expenditure. This is more worrying, for it means that the Nepal Army is investing less in the future. Any downsizing of the military, without reducing the overall budget, would free a larger share of the budget for the military to invest in modern technologies for the future.

The size of the army also becomes an issue because of the expanding footprint of the military into non-core areas, such as the construction of infrastructure and even business ventures. As a result, the army has become sluggish regarding combat readiness and deployment.

Hence, the debate is not about merely downsizing to cut costs but professionalizing the military.

The more pertinent question raised by Poudyal relates to the overall “utility” of the military. Citing repeated instances of border encroachment, she alleged that the army has failed in its primary role: to protect Nepal’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Poudyal pointed out that Nepal’s army would not be able to withstand any war with neighboring countries.

Given China and India’s relative size and power, such an assumption may sound logical. Nevertheless, analyzing the role of the military in such stark terms is a gross misunderstanding and reductive. The military’s role is not just to win wars but to thwart such attacks before they happen and defend the territory if attacked.

A look at what is unfolding in Ukraine, where a relatively more minor force has been able to withstand attacks from a larger and wealthier country, gives a broader understanding of the role of the military.

Issues including the nature and the role of the military should be debated. However, ensuring that such debate is proper and not disparaging to the force that is ultimately responsible for the nation’s security is also essential.

Equally concerning is the nature of the backlash received by the parliamentarians and the defensiveness of the army.

Poudyal’s social media was flooded with comments about her being a sellout, an agent of a foreign country, or taking up the issue to weaken the military.

As a parliamentarian in a country where the army operates under civilian rule, she has every right and responsibility to debate the military’s size and role. Such debate is overdue. The size of Nepal’s military almost doubled during the Maoist insurgency, increasing from 45,000 to 96,000 now. Now that the domestic political context has changed, as have the regional and global dynamics, there should be a corresponding debate on the role and security strategy of the country.

Therefore, the defensiveness of the military force is worrying.

In March, Army Chief General Prabhu Ram Sharma dismissed the calls for downsizing by “self-proclaimed academics, experts, and security experts working in non-governmental organizations and international non-governmental organizations.” He called them “outsiders” working at the behest of foreign powers. Now, the military has responded quietly, saying that the government determines the army’s size based on the needs.

However, retired military officials have taken up the mantle of counterpunch.

Former Army Chief General Gaurav S.J.B. Rana slammed the calls for downsizing the military as “undeveloped” and “unschooled opinion.” Stating that the military is a valuable asset of the state to be cherished, Rana insisted that the “process to determine the size, composition, and capabilities of the military is best left to the military professionals, under the stewardship of the government.”

Meanwhile, another retired army chief, General Binoj Basnyat, called for doing away with the costly federal system, among others, to bring in enough resources required for national development.

Besides, both Rana and Basnyat point out that the military remains the most trusted institution in the country and, thus, should not be questioned.

As per a survey, 91.2 percent of Nepali people trusted the military, compared to 44 percent who trusted political parties. Therefore, they argue that the army is a far more responsible actor and absolved of any public debate.

Their comments imply that the Nepal Army should not be questioned. Indeed, parliamentarians are also cautious when talking about the military. Poudyal said that she was discouraged by senior leaders of different parties from talking about the military issues a few days after her statement caused public fury.

In saying that, there are commonalities between those seeking a debate on the army’s role and those defensive about any discussion. Both understand that regional and global geopolitical currents are changing rapidly; a war between two countries, seen as unlikely over the past few decades, has become a reality today.

Such geopolitical changes have thrust Nepal into the center of regional and global geopolitical tussles. Together with the changed domestic security context, a discussion of security strategy and the military’s corresponding size, shape, and form is much needed. The Nepali military of 2005 will not be able to meet the challenges of today.

However, when civilian leaders debate the size and role of the military, the military understands it as “downsizing,” making it defensive.

Therefore, the first step is bridging the trust gap between the civilian and military leadership. Then both sides can sit together and rationally chart the way appropriate for the current and future needs of the country and reform the military as per need.

The Explainer - NIPoRe Blog

Women in Nepal’s Diplomacy – Brief Analysis

– SANTOSH Sharma Poudel

“An ambassador is not just an emissary but a bridge, a mediator between cultures and countries.” – Robert Blackwill

Ambassadors are among the key cogs in the conduct of diplomacy. They are responsible for promoting their respective countries’ national interests, negotiating and navigating with policymakers, providing information and recommendations based on ground information, facilitating diplomatic and economic relations, and promoting the home countries in the host countries, among others. Essentially, they are the face of their home countries and the bridge to the host countries.

Besides their roles, the ‘face’ of the ambassadors can also be a source of signaling. For example, the profile of the ambassadors appointed could hint at the importance of the country and the kind of image the home country would like to project abroad. 

I have briefly analyzed what ambassadors’ ‘faces’ hint at in this article from a gendered lens. To do so, I have looked at the resident ambassadors from foreign countries to Nepal, including the UN country representative (or the last ambassador if there is no ambassador currently appointed, and current Nepali ambassadors stationed in Nepali embassies abroad from a gendered lens. The summary is just a snapshot of the scenario and not a trend. Hence, this should not be over-generalized or extrapolated to analyze the ‘face’ of specific countries across time and space. Also, the article does not compare the effectiveness of the roles performed by ambassadors of various genders, though that is an area for further research.

The following table provides the summary:

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nepal; websites of resident embassies in Nepal (Last accessed on 17 March 2023)

The table shows that eight of the 26 resident foreign ambassadors in Kathmandu (including the UN Country representative) are women. The women ambassadors account for one in three resident ambassadors. Among the OECD members (including the UN), half of the 12 ambassadors are women. Sri Lanka and Egypt are the only two women ambassadors from non-OECD countries. The UN and the OECD members have been at the forefront of promoting gender equality in Nepal. Their appointment of ambassadors reflects that message. 

On the other side, Nepal has 30 embassies abroad and three permanent UN missions. Of the 33 ambassadors, only three are women. In other words, Nepal has appointed ten men ambassadors for every one woman ambassador. This shows that, despite government policies, men dominate Nepal’s diplomacy. The three women ambassadors are appointed to the OECD member countries (Israel, South Korea, and Spain). It could be because Nepal wants to portray progress made on gender equality in those advanced countries which largely provide aid in the sector.

Nepal has taken critical legal steps to ensure women’s representation in the political, bureaucratic, and social arena. Despite the efforts, most areas are highly male-dominated with some token women representation. Even at the MoFA, the senior posts (joint secretaries) are men-dominated. In this context, the lower number of women ambassadors only reflects the limited presence of women in diplomacy. Women’s presence is also negligible among the ‘foreign policy experts’ outside formal diplomacy.

In this context, the government should prioritize the appointment of women ambassadors based on political affiliation/expertise to compensate for the numerical gap at the senior level in the MoFA until MoFA becomes more representative at the senior level. It is high time that Nepal’s face is represented abroad by ‘representative’ ambassadors.

This blog is a part of NIPoRe’s blog series on Women’s History Month 2023.

OP-EDs and Columns

Nepal PM’s Foreign Policy Plate is Full

– SANTOSH Sharma Poudel

The column originally appeared in The Diplomat on 16 January 2023. Please read the original article here.

Nepali politics continues to confound observers. Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Center (CPN-MC) chief Pushpa Kamal Dahal, who was sworn in as prime minister on December 26 despite his party standing third in the recent general elections, received a strong but surprising boost in a trust vote in parliament on January 10 when his former electoral alliance partners, the Sher Bahadur Deuba-led Nepali Congress (NC) and the Madhav Kumar Nepal-led Communist Party of Nepal-United Socialist (CPN-US), voted in support of his new government.

Less than a fortnight ago, Dahal ditched the NC and CPN-US to head a government with support from the Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli-led Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML). NC and CPN-US backed Dahal in the confidence vote despite his last-minute betrayal.

The decision of the NC and CPN-US to support Dahal has become the topic of much discussion in Nepal. Some speculate that Deuba might have supported Dahal in an attempt to secure a share in the spoils of power. Others see Deuba’s move as aimed at driving a wedge between Dahal and Oli. Meanwhile, others see it as a shrewd move by Dahal to minimize Oli’s influence in the ruling coalition. Whatever the reason, it is evident that instrumentalism determines Nepali politics, and that gaining power is the only currency.

The ruling coalition comprises parties with diverse interests and political goals. Its survival and domestic issues will be Prime Minister Dahal’s primary focus. Speeches of leaders in the new parliament focused on domestic issues like good governance, political stability, corruption control, and effective implementation of federalism.

Coalition partners wield considerable leverage in the new government and Oli, who heads the largest party in this coalition, will exercise significant control. He leads the mechanism to support the government and develop a common minimum program for the coalition government. His leverage will increase if the presidency or the house speakership (or both) go to the CPN-UML. Dahal seems to be in for a rough ride.

Meanwhile, several issues on the foreign policy front deserve Dahal’s immediate attention. The need for Nepal to “balance” its engagement with the big powers – India, the U.S., and China – in the context of heightened Sino-Indian and Sino-U.S. competition while maintaining strategic autonomy and sovereignty will be a major challenge. Another is Nepal’s widening trade deficit. Such challenges have intensified in recent times.

Dahal will need to tackle several issues with India. Firstly, he will need to decide on India’s Agnipath scheme. The previous government, of which Dahal’s party was a coalition partner, kicked the Agnipath can down the road for the next government to deal with. The Agnipath scheme provides for short-term recruitment into the Indian Army, which violates the tripartite agreement between Nepal, Great Britain and India regarding the recruitment of Nepali Gurkhas into the Indian and British armies. Last year, such recruitment in Nepal was suspended because Kathmandu was opposed to the short-term recruitment of Nepalis into the Indian Army. The current government does not have the luxury of delaying a decision on the matter as Gurkha recruitment from Nepal, which has been a critical element in Indo-Nepal relations, is in jeopardy.

Secondly, Nepal needs New Delhi’s cooperation to export hydroelectricity to Bangladesh. In August last year, Nepal and Bangladesh decided to request India to allow the export of 40-50 MW of Nepali hydropower to Bangladesh as Nepal needs to use the Indian grid (via Indian territory) to export electricity to Bangladesh.

When Nepali officials raised the issue during the recent Power Summit organized by the Confederation of Indian Industries on grid connectivity in the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Indian officials said that the Baharampur-Bheramara line connecting Nepal to Bangladesh was “fully occupied.” Therefore, the issue will test Dahal’s diplomatic skills.

Thirdly, Nepal has requested that India grant air entry points to facilitate aircraft movement to Bhairahawa and Pokhara. The two airports were built by Chinese companies, though the former was funded by the Asian Development Bank. Without India granting appropriate entry points, airplanes will need to circle in Nepal for a few minutes before landing, increasing operational costs. Kathmandu should engage India at the earliest to ensure the international airports are sustainable for airlines to use.

Fourthly, Dahal needs to continue the “return to normalcy” in India-Nepal relations after its nadir in 2020, when the Oli government amended the Nepali map to include Kalapani, Limpiyadhura, and Lipulekh in the far west – territories also claimed by India.

There are also issues with China that require immediate attention. One is China’s opening of the Kerung border point. This was closed with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic but was reopened after Dahal assumed the premiership recently. There are concerns in Nepal over the reopening of this border point amid the surge in COVID-19 cases in China.

Nepal needs clarity on its position on Global Security Initiative (GSI), a Chinese initiative to counter rival regional blocs such as the Quad. Beijing is keen for Nepal to join the GSI. Although Nepal has clarified its commitment to non-alignment, which would mean Nepal will not join any security pacts with any country, President Bidhya Devi Bhandari joined the GSI meeting last year despite the Deuba-led government’s reservations.

Also, Beijing is impatient to see projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) take off in Nepal. Days after Dahal’s appointment as prime minister, a Chinese delegation came to Nepal to conduct a feasibility study of the Kathmandu-Kerung railway connectivity. With a friendlier government in power, Beijing would like to see BRI projects make concrete progress.

Whether Dahal makes New Delhi or Beijing the destination of his first foreign visit will be keenly watched. However, it will be pragmatic if he were to pick New Delhi first, ceteris paribus. As much as his visit to Beijing would show that he is attempting to balance between Nepal’s two giant neighbors, which every leader in Nepal professes and which is the official foreign policy, the fact is that Nepal has more issues that require immediate engagement with its southern neighbor.

Kathmandu is abuzz with speculation that New Delhi wanted Deuba, not Dahal, to lead the new government. However, despite New Delhi’s suspicions of Dahal and Dahal’s earlier misgivings regarding New Delhi, Nepal needs healthy relations with India. He might get a warmer welcome in Beijing than in New Delhi. Yet, a visit to New Delhi will show his intent to tackle difficult issues head-on, not shy away from them.

In this context, his decision to make New Delhi the first port of call, likely to be in late February or early March, is a mature decision. He has the experience of engaging India as prime minister and has a host of immediate and enduring issues on his plate. His level of success in resolving those issues will determine his legacy.

OP-EDs and Columns

Putting national interest first

NISCHAL Dhungel* and ABIJIT SHARMA

Dhungel is a non-resident fellow at NIPoRe. The opinion piece originally appeared in The Kathmandu Post on 18 January 2023. Please read the original article here.

With the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war, foreign relations trembled among major economic powers. While condemning Russia’s aggression and barraging the country with a series of sanctions, the West expected India to follow suit. However, New Delhi adopted studied public neutrality and abstained from successive votes condemning the Russian move in the UN Security Council, General Assembly, and Human Rights Council. Just like India, China maintained relative neutrality, with a solid foreign policy stance in response to the conflict. Despite its closeness with Russia, Beijing stopped short of supporting it in the war. It also stopped short of calling Russia the aggressor and abstained from a United Nations Security Council vote denouncing the ‘invasion’. Beijing and New Delhi had made their decision loud and clear. And they were not going to listen to anybody.

Assertive New Delhi

Speaking at the Globsec 2022 forum in Slovakia, Minister of External Affairs of India, Dr S Jaishankar laid clear India’s increasingly confident foreign policy. “Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems,” Jaishankar said. He criticised the West for hoarding vaccines, which impacted the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). It is crucial to understand how India came to this position, which was unimaginable until a few years ago.

India’s political, social and economic fabric had been damaged after 200 years of colonialism. Its foreign policy could not remain untouched. Following independence, New Delhi slowly started to chart its own path, pursuing different strategic approaches from 1946 to 2013. Nehruvian influence persisted from 1946 to 62, an era of strategic non-alignment amidst US-Soviet Union rivalry. From 1962 to 1971, considered the decade of realism and recovery, India made pragmatic choices in national security and political challenges despite a lack of resources. The country went through a complex phase from 1971 to 1991 as the US-China-Pakistan axis came up. From 1991 to 1999, it had challenges in retaining its strategic autonomy in a unipolar world, whereas from 2000 to 2013, India focused on balancing power.

But since assuming office in 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made an unprecedented transformation of Indian foreign policy. Modi has put India as an emerging superpower on the map and sought to engage rather than remain ‘non-aligned actively’. New Delhi now understands that it deals with multiple global complexities, making decisions based on calculated risk-taking. As a result, India is slowly standing out, drifting away from strategic ambiguity to strategic freedom and taking a solid foreign policy stance on international fora. This is a significant departure from the older ‘non-alignment’ tenet that had long established India’s typical social values and norms, at least in foreign relations.

India’s central foreign policy tenet under Modi is seen to be guided by the Eastern principle of ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’, which translates to “the world is one family”. This was evident during the Covid-19 pandemic when New Delhi delivered more than 100 million doses to countries in Asia and Africa. While Modi has spearheaded this new brand of foreign policy, his bureaucrats and ministers have helped implement it. In 2015, just two days before his retirement, the Narendra Modi government appointed a highly agile foreign service officer, a foreign ambassador to the US and China, to the position of foreign secretary. Jaishankar has been the flag bearer of Modi’s foreign policy ever since Modi’s second term in office. Jaishankar openly admits India’s shortcomings and stays committed to securing its national interest with/without taking any sides.

‘Wolf-warrior’ in Beijing

Coinciding with India’s assertive stance in global politics is China’s equally aggressive stance, especially against the West. The Chinese foreign policy has been so assertive and aggressive in recent years that it has earned a new name: ‘Wolf-warrior’. While aggressive Chinese rhetoric might appear quite normal now, it is a shift from China’s earlier foreign policy. And the man to bring about this shift is none other than Xi Jinping. At heart, Xi’s diplomacy calls for a more active role for China as a great power on the world stage, including reforming the Western-dominated international order and creating what China calls “true multilateralism”.

When the architect of China’s economic reform, Deng Xiaoping, came to power following Mao Zedong’s death in the late 1970s, he prescribed a foreign policy which was subtle and cooperative. His approach focused on “biding one’s time without revealing one’s strength”. As a result, in the 1980s and 90s, Beijing was focused on “securing position, coping with affairs calmly and hiding capacities”. The leaders who came to power after Deng continued the policy.

But Xi’s ascendance since 2012 has slowly changed things in Beijing. Far from “biding time and hiding strengths”, it is now focused on making its stance clear on the global stage. Most importantly, it is open to show its strength. Take, for instance, its recent response to the Taiwan issue. Just before the then US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited the island in August last year, the Chinese President issued a stern warning to his American counterpart, allegedly saying that “… those who play with fire would perish by it”. When its alarm went unheeded, the Chinese military launched targeted military exercises.

Xi’s ambitions to help China regain its glory of the Middle Kingdom years have been evident since he took office. Upon gaining power in 2012, he immediately identified “national rejuvenation” as his primary goal. The ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was announced a year later. At the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi stated that China would no longer shy away from world leadership and efforts shaping the international order. The BRI is an important example of how China has pursued its foreign policy interest. The initiative has 147 signatories and includes US allies and partners such as Saudi Arabia, Greece and UAE.

Quite naturally, the West has been critical of this stance, often saying that it might invite dangerous confrontations between China and the West. But Beijing has maintained that it is not the real aggressor but simply responding to Western threats. Defending China’s aggressive foreign policy, the then-Chinese Foreign Vice Minister Le Yucheng said last year that Beijing “had no choice but to fight back against constant ‘nagging’ and ‘insults’ from foreign critics”. Interestingly China has many flag bearers of this new assertive foreign policy, most notably the foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian. Zhao has had public spats with US diplomats and has been a vocal critic of the West.

If there is any lesson that Nepal should learn from its neighbours, it is that we need to pursue an independent foreign policy, especially in light of the geo-political games often played in the country.

OP-EDs and Columns

Nepal’s Ad Hoc Policies Toward China

– SANTOSH Sharma Poudel

The column originally appeared in The Diplomat on 25 August 2022. Please read the original article here.

A day after U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, Chinese Ambassador to Nepal Hou Yanqi released a statement denouncing the visit. In the statement, Hou “highly appreciated” Nepal’s longstanding commitment to the One China principle.

In a subtle warning, she reminded Nepal that the One China principle was the foundation of Sino-Nepali relations and expressed hope that Kathmandu would continue to abide by the principle and support China’s legitimate interests. Hou also urged cooperation to “defend each other’s sovereignty, security and territorial integrity.”

Then on August 5, Hou met with Nepali Home Minister Bal Krishna Khand. In the meeting, Khand reassured the Chinese envoy of Nepal’s position on the One China policy. Nepal would not allow any forces to use Nepali territory for “anti-China separatist activities,” he said.

This was followed by a hastily arranged trip of Nepali Foreign Minister Narayan Khadka to Beijing on August 9-11 at the invitation of China’s State Councilor and Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi. Both countries billed his trip as a return visit in the wake of Wang’s visit to Nepal in March.

Khadka’s visit also followed two high-level Chinese visits in recent months. However, the timing and both countries’ statements during and after the visit indicate that Pelosi’s Taiwan visit was a critical factor.

Nepal frequently reiterates its commitments in support of the One China policy and “not allowing Nepali land to be used against Chinese interests.” Prime ministers, foreign ministers, foreign secretaries, and others in leadership positions across time and political parties have restated these commitments to the Chinese. Nepali Foreign Policy 2077 also codifies the latter. As Hou stated, these are the foundations of China-Nepal relations.

There is little doubt that Nepal is sincerely committed to these principles and policies. Unfortunately, Nepal’s understanding of the implications of those principles is less clear-cut.

The implications of the One China principle are relatively easy to understand. Under the principle, Nepal (as do most countries worldwide) believes the People’s Republic of China to be the sole representative of China. In that context, Tibet and Taiwan are parts of China. Thus, Nepal has helped repress the political activities of the Tibetan refugees because China considers the Dalai Lama a separatist.

The implication of Nepal’s second commitment — i.e. not allowing its territory to be used for activities that could undermine Chinese interests — is more complex. The principle is sensible but requires an understanding and agreement between Nepal and China on what legitimate Chinese interests are.

Nepal’s lack of a shared national understanding allows for ad hoc decision-making. Also, not all of Nepal’s interests align perfectly with Chinese interests.

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a $500-million grant program from the U.S. to build transport and energy infrastructure in Nepal, tested the principle. Beijing was fiercely opposed to Nepal ratifying the agreement and vocal in raising its concerns. Experts in Nepal were bitterly divided over whether Chinese security concerns regarding the grant were legitimate. Eventually, Nepal went ahead with the ratification, displeasing Beijing. Nepal has sought to reassure Beijing that its interests would not be harmed.

In July, Nepal wrote a letter to the U.S. government rescinding the State Partnership Program (SPP), an exchange program between an American state’s National Guard and a partner foreign country. Nepal and the Utah National Guard signed the SPP in 2019. In Beijing’s perception, the agreement is part of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy.

Despite American clarifications that the SPP is not a security or military alliance, Nepal decided to withdraw from the agreement to address Chinese sensitivity on the issue.

Nepal may have a rationale for both decisions, but they point to the ad hoc nature of understanding what constitutes actions against the interest of its neighbors. Such behavior opens the door for influence peddling or even bullying, especially given the meek nature of Nepali bureaucrats and political leaders vis-à-vis their Chinese counterparts.

Additionally, the need for Nepal to regurgitate those principles in every meeting with Chinese leaders indicates China’s insecurity over developments in its neighborhood. Beijing may also be justifiably concerned with Nepal’s ability to implement the principles, though it has praised Nepal’s efforts to limit the activities of Tibetan refugees.

Either way, it is high time that foreign and security policy stakeholders in Nepal reach a common minimum consensus. It would help Nepal engage China on an equal footing. At the same time, it will clarify what Nepali “red lines” are to Beijing. Without such understanding, Nepali policies will continue to be ad hoc and reactionary.

SAB Blog

SAB Blog – Nepal

Domestic Updates

Nepal held local elections on 13 May. It was the second such election after Nepal went into the federal governance structure. A few results were surprising as independent candidates won top mayoral positions in major cities like Kathmandu metropolitan city (the capital) and Dharan sub-metropolitan city. Nepali Congress topped the charts among the ruling coalition of five parties, and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre) did well to come in third. The main opposition party, the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist), came second though most expected the party to perform better. Nepal will also hold its federal elections later this year in November.

A Tara Air flight carrying 22 people crashed into a mountain at an altitude of about 14,500 feet. It was Nepal’s 19th plane crash in 10 years and Tara Air’s 10th fatal one during the same period. The European Union (EU) has barred Nepali airlines from European airspace since 2013 owing to poor safety records. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba inaugurated Nepal’s second international airport in Lumbini, the birthplace of Gautam Buddha.

Regional Engagement

On the occasion of Buddha Jayanti (Buddha’s birth, nirvana, and death all were on the same date), Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Lumbini, the birthplace of Buddha. The visit was Modi’s fifth to Nepal, and he had visited Hindu religious sites in his four previous visits. Nepali Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba and Modi witnessed the exchange of six MOUs relating to the power and education sector. One was between India’s Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam Ltd and Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) to develop and implement the Arun IV hydropower project. Additionally, Nepal has signed agreements to sell up to 364 MW of electricity in the open market in India.

Nepal-India relation has been hot and cold during Modi’s reign. In 2014, Modi became the first Indian prime minister to visit Nepal in 17 years and received adulation across the board. However, the Indian blockade of Nepal in 2015 and overlapping territorial claims have tested the relations. Nevertheless, the relationship has recently improved, especially in energy connectivity.

Deuba inaugurated Gautam Buddha International Airport earlier that day, but Modi chose to land on a custom-built helipad 16 kilometers away. Many analysts argue that Modi snubbed the airport because it was built by a Chinese contractor (though financed by the Asian Development Bank). Nepal has the daunting task of balancing Indian and Chinese engagement and interests in Nepal.

At the foreign secretary-level, the 14th meeting of the Nepal-China Diplomatic Consultation Mechanism took place. Both sides talked about cooperation for mutual benefits and the further promotion of bilateral ties. However, China expressed displeasure at the US Undersecretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights, Uzra Zeya’s visit to Tibetan refugee camps in Kathmandu (more on this below).

Global Engagement

Zeya, the United States under secretary for civilian security, democracy, and human rights, visited two Tibetan refugee camps in Nepal. She is also the special coordinator for Tibetan issues. She went forward with visiting refugee camps despite Nepal’s reservations, though Nepal formally feigned ignorance of the visit. Nepal is home to over 13,000 Tibetan refugees and is a sensitive issue in Nepal-China relations. Nepal ascribes to the one-China policy, which states Tibet and Taiwan are integral parts of China, ever since diplomatic relations were established.

To assuage Chinese concerns, Nepal re-expressed its commitment to the One-China policy. However, the amalgamation of geopolitics and human rights principles makes Nepal’s handling of Tibetan refugees tricky. It has also been an arena for Sino-US competition in Nepal.

NIPoRe DatavizNIPoRe Updates

NDV0008 – Nepali Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s Foreign Trips

For all the Heads of the States around the world, it is a commonplace phenomenon to travel around countries across the continents either for State Visits or Official Visits or attending major meetings. And Nepal’s incumbent Prime Minister, Mr. KP Sharma Oli, is not an exception. In fact, these trips not only help the leaders to make their all possible efforts to have their regional and global influence in highly globalized modern world but also to build better relations with respective countries’ diaspora across the globe through formal and informal gatherings.

In the case of Mr. Oli, who has been serving his second prime ministership since 15th February 2018, he has made foreign trips to ten countries (as of November 04, 2019). In addition to China and India, Nepal’s immediate neighbors, PM Oli has also travelled to four of the world’s major economies – France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. In addition, he and his delegation have also travelled to new and rising economies – Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Costa Rica, and Vietnam.

PM KP SHARMA OLI’S FOREIGN TRIPS

Below, we highlight PM Oli’s all foreign trips as the 41st Prime Minister of Nepal. We have discounted PM Oli’s two trips to Singapore (made during August – September, 2019) in this data visualizations as those visits were meant for his personal health check-ups only.

2019

Azerbaijan (October)

Nepali Prime Minister and his 21-member Nepali delegation travelled to Baku, Azerbaijan and attended the 18th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) that ran for October 25-26, 2019. Nepal is one of the founding members of NAM and the principles of non-alignment form core strategy of Nepal’s foreign policy practices. While in Baku, PM Oli addressed the leaders of Summit on “Upholding the Bandung Principles to Ensure Concerted and Adequate Response to the Challenges of Contemporary World” topic.

France (June)

In June, PM Oli and his Nepali delegation went to Paris, France for an Official Visit. During the 3-day Visit (June 12-15) to the Republic, PM Oli attended a programme organized by the Federation of National Chambers of Industries and Commerce of France (MEDEF) at the Federation’s Headquarters. In addition, he also attended few gatherings organized by the Embassy of Nepal in Paris and also by France-Nepal Friendship Society. PM Oli also took his France Visit occasion to make an official announcement of Visit Nepal Year 2020 in the French Republic.

United Kingdom (June)

The Nepali Prime Minister and his official delegation made an Official Trip to Oxford and London in the United Kingdom. During the 3-day long trip (June 10-12), PM Oli addressed at the Oxford Union on ‘Peace, Democracy and Development’. While in London, the Nepali leader also held meetings with the then British Prime Minister, Theresa May, and a key member of the British Royal Family, Prince Harry. In addition, PM Oli also addressed a group of professionals representing the All Party Parliamentary Group for Nepal (APPG) and the British Group on Inter-Parliamentary Union (BGIPU). The Nepali delegation also held formal meetings with officials from the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), Non-Resident Nepalis, and the British Gurkhas. Towards the end of the Trip, a Joint UK-Nepal Communique was released by the Foreign Ministers of both the nations.

Switzerland (June)

To attend the Centenary International Labor Conference, PM Oli and a high-level official Nepali delegation travelled to Geneva, Switzerland. During his stay in Geneva (June June 09-10), PM Oli addressed the Conference participants. In addition, Mr. Oli also met Nepali community and Friends of Nepal in Geneva.

India (May)

At the invitation of his Indian counterpart Mr. Narendra Modi, the Nepali Prime Minister travelled to India for an official visit. During the visit (May 30-31), PM Oli attended the oath-taking ceremony of Mr. Modi, who was reelected as the Prime Minister of India from country’s 17th Loksabha Elections.

Cambodia (May)

The Nepali Prime Minister and an official delegation visited Cambodia for an official visit. During the 3-day visit (May 13-15), besides holding talks with the key Cambodian leaders, PM Oli and his Cambodian counterpart witnessed the signing of an agreement for Nepal-Cambodia trade and economic cooperation. In addition, the visit also made it possible for the Nepal Chamber of Commerce and Cambodia Chamber of Commerce to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). During the visit, PM Oli also addressed the participants of Nepal – Cambodia Business Forum. While in Phnom Penh, PM Oli and his delegation also met with representatives from Non-Resident Nepali Association (NRNA) Cambodia Chapter. The major accomplishments of this visit and future plans in this regard were later highlighted in a joint-statement.

Vietnam (May)

At the invitation of the Prime Minister of Vietnam, Mr. Nguyen Xuan Phuc, Nepali leader and his delegation travelled to Vietnam for a 5-day official visit. During the trip, PM Oli and his team visited few historical and touristic places in the country including Ha Long Bay, one of Vietnam’s UNESCO World Heritage Sites and released a English-Vietnamese translated book “Nepal: Peace is at Hand” to share Nepal’s experiences with the Vietnamese readers. In addition, the Nepali delegation also held a meeting with the representatives of Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI). During the trip, PM Oli addressed a gathering at the Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics. In addition, he also addressed the participants of Vietnam – Nepal Business Forum in Hanoi. Furthermore, PM Oli also attended and made an address at an event organized to mark the 16th UN Day of Vesar (Buddha’s Birthday) in Ha Nam Province. A joint-statement was also released on the occasion of PM Oli’s official visit to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

Switzerland (January)

In January 2019, Nepali Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli became the first sitting leader of the Himalayan nation to attend and speak at an annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. During his visit, PM Oli attended two sessions at the 49th Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum (WEF) as a panelist, namely Strategic Outlook on South Asia and Shaping the Future of Democracy. Besides regular WEF events, PM Oli also met with the representatives from Non-Resident Nepali Association (NRNA) Switzerland Chapter, Swiss-Nepalese Society. While on his way to Kathmandu, PM Oli also visited Innovation and Entrepreneurship Centre at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zurich).

2018

Costa Rica (September – October)

At the invitation of the President of the Republic of Costa Rica, Mr. Carlos Alvarado Quesada, the Nepali Prime Minister and his official delegation travelled to San José, the capital city of the Latin American nation. Mr. Oli became the first sitting Nepali Prime Minister to visit Costa Rica. Besides regular political and diplomatic meetings and also visiting a few places in the country, Mr. Oli also addressed a gathering at the University for Peace (UPEACE), the University later awarded Nepali Prime Minister with the Honorary Doctorate.

United States of America (September)

To attend the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), leading the Nepali delegation, Mr. KP Sharma Oli visited the United States of America. While in New York, PM Oli addressed the 73rd Session of UNGA, made remarks at the High-Level Event on Action for Peacekeeping (A4P), and delivered a public lecture on “Peace, Democracy and Development” at the Asia Society.

China (June)

More than two months after his State Visit to country’s immediate southern neighbor, PM Oli and his delegation travelled to China, Nepal’s immediate northern neighbor, for a 6-day long Official Visit (June 19-24). PM Oli made this trip at the invitation of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang.

During this visit, PM Oli made series of high-level political and diplomatic meetings. In addition, Mr. Oli also witnessed the signing of an agreement for cooperation between Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) and the State Grid Corporation of China for undertaking a feasibility study of Nepal-China cross-border power grid interconnection project across the Kerung-Rasuwagadhi-Galchhi-Ratmate transmission line (400 kV). Moreover, representatives from Nepali business and tourism communities also signed eight Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) in the areas of hydropower generation, manufacturing, river training, and agriculture. The overall accomplishments of the visit and future course of actions in this regard were highlighted in a joint-statement between Nepal and the People’s Republic of China.

During the trip, PM Oli addressed a reception organized by the Embassy of Nepal in Beijing. In addition, the Nepali leader also inaugurated and addressed at the 2018 Nepal-China Business Forum. To enable Beijing-based Nepali diplomatic mission’s outreach among Chinese audiences, PM Oli also launched the official WeChat account of the Embassy of Nepal in Beijing.

India (April)

PM Oli made his first foreign trip to India after he assumed his second prime ministership responsibilities. At the invitation of his Indian counterpart, Mr. Narendra Modi, PM Oli and his Nepali delegation travelled to India on a State Visit during April 06-08, 2018.

During this trip, PM Oli and PM Modi inaugurated the Integrated Check Post at Birgunj (Nepal) with an aim to further boost cross-border trade and movement of people across Nepal-India border. The Nepal-India border is one of the oldest open borders in the world and remains one of the modern world’s very few such borders that witnesses flow of thousands of people on a single day.

This visit also witnessed the release of four joint-statements, one on the Nepali Prime Minister’s State Visit and three others on Nepal and India’s three key areas of interest. Three such statements were made, one each on, India-Nepal Statement on New Partnership in Agriculture, Expanding Rail Linkages: Connecting Raxaul in India to Kathmandu in Nepal, and New Connectivity between India and Nepal through Inland Waterways.

NIPoRe DatavizNIPoRe UpdatesResearch

NDV0004 – President Xi Jinping’s State Visits – SAARC Vs ASEAN

Chinese President Xi Jinping travelled to Nepal for a two-day state visit between October 12 and 13 this year. He became the first Chinese president to visit Nepal since December 1996 when Jiang Zemin visited the Himalayan nation. President Xi’s rare visit to Nepal this year indicates that China – the second largest world economy and one of the major global players in world politics – have Nepal in its foreign policy priority. During his visit, a list of instruments was signed. Later on, Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs had released the Joint-Statement between Nepal and the People’s Republic of China.

After taking responsibility as the President of the People’s Republic of China, President Xi has had made a series of state visits to countries in South and South East Asia indicating China’s interests in pursuing country’s major foreign policy priorities across countries in South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regions.

Here, based on information from XINHUANET, we highlight few interesting facts about President Xi’s state visits to SAARC and ASEAN member countries.

9 and 11 Months: Between March 2013 and October 2019, President Xi Jinping has travelled to ASEAN and SAARC member countries for a state visit, on average, every 9 and 11 months respectively.

Minus 1: ASEAN and SAARC have welcomed President Xi for state visits to their members countries for 9 and 7 occasions respectively (Number of associations’ member countries minus 1 times).

2 and 1: There are only 2 countries – 1 country each in each region – that have hosted President Xi twice for state visits.

4 and 2: Only 4 countries in these regions – 2 countries each in each region – are yet to welcome the incumbent Chinese leader for a state visit.

Research Commentaries

NRC0015 – Nepali foreign policy and Zone of Peace: an attempt at neutrality?

Santosh Sharma Poudel

Synopsis

In my last Research Commentary, I summarized that Nepali foreign policy moved from ‘special relations’ with India towards diversification in the 1950s and 1960s. This period coincides with the direct rule of King Birendra. In this commentary, I analyze the country’s foreign policy in the 1970s and 1980s via the proposal of Zone of Peace. This period provides a stark reminder of the practical constraints of Nepal’s foreign policy priorities.

Domestic Political Developments

As seen in the previous two decades, domestic politics has been one of the major factors informing Nepal’s foreign policy, if not determining itself. The 1970s and 1980s were relatively stable periods under the then Panchayat System. The Prime Ministers were rotated heavily, but the power always rested with the King. King Birendra ascended the throne in 1972. During his coronation, which was attended by a large number of diplomatic dignitaries, he proposed Nepal to be made a ‘Zone of Peace’. It was a major initiative from the King, and the analysis of the intention and progress of the proposal reflects the foreign policy of Nepal during the period. There was the matter of ‘referendum’ in 1980, but the result was in favor of ‘reformed Panchayat’, and it did not alter the domestic dynamics much. Towards the end of this period, there was ‘Jana Andolan’ in Nepal, led by the Nepali Congress and communist parties, which overthrew the direct rule of the King, established multi-party democracy, and cosigned the King to a constitutional monarchy.

Zone of Peace (ZOP)

King Birendra’s prepared speech during the Non-Aligned Summit in 1973 stated that Nepal ‘wishes to be declared a Zone of Peace’. However, the official announcement of the ZOP by the King was made on 25th February 1975, during the farewell address delivered to the foreign dignitaries present to celebrate his coronation ceremony. His focus was on peace, peace in the country, the region and the world, and believed that ‘Zone of Peace’ will help institutionalize peace. Major points of the proposal included peace, non-alignment and peaceful coexistence, Nepal would not permit any activities on its soil that are hostile to other states supporting the proposal and expect reciprocity, and Nepal will not enter into any military alliance with any other countries among others. Nepal planned to take the proposal to the UN for endorsement.

There were international and domestic reasons for the proposal. Domestically, it was about maintaining stability, as the democratic opposition to the Panchayat regime came from Nepali exiles in India. It was also an opportunity for King Birendra to stamp his authority in Nepal’s foreign policy. Regionally, few issues were of real concern to Nepal. Nepal had a close eye on the political development in Sikkim. Sikkim, an independent state with ethnic Nepali people, was absorbed into the union territory of India in 1975. That was an urgent issue of concern for Nepal, a country that has inferiority complex vis-à-vis India. Many also had concerns that India could attempt a similar policy towards Nepal. Therefore, Nepal needed to ascertain its survival. Similarly, Nepal did not want to insert itself into the regional and global rivalries (such as India-Pakistan, Sino-India, US-USSR), and would rather expend its limited resources for peace and growth. Notwithstanding the justifications of the ZOP, it marked a significant change in the orientation of foreign policy of Nepal compared to a decade earlier.

Neutrality, not ‘balance’

The foreign policy of Nepal in the 1950s and 1960s was marked by movement along with the ‘special relations with India’ to ‘diversification in economic, trade, aid and global engagement’. In saying that, the relations with India was still the most important. ‘Zone of Peace’ was an attempt at ‘neutrality’ or ‘equidistance’, doing away with ‘special relations with India’. ZOP would do away with the concept of Nepal as ‘buffer state’, the strategic view that India held since the time of Jawaharlal Nehru. An agreement on such a proposal would also limit the role of India in Nepal’s domestic politics. Firstly, it would have limited the activities and some freedom enjoyed by exiled political leaders in India. Secondly, requests were made for the withdrawal of Indian intelligence posts in Nepal.

Two regional incidents also heightened the insecurity in Nepal vis-à-vis India. First, India played an active role in the breaking up of East Pakistan to form an independent Bangladesh in 1971. China, Pakistan’s all-weather friend, could not do much to change the scenario in which India got a decisive victory. The second was the dissolution of the Kingdom of Sikkim into the Indian union territory in 1975. Within a span of five years, the political map of South Asia changed significantly, thanks to India. This was bound to have a profound impact on the psyche of another small nation that shared a deeply unequal power relations with India.

Therefore, according to S.K. Upadhyaya, Nepal’s former Permanent Representative to the UN, ZOP, was the only way to ensure small nation’s (Nepal’s) survival when large powers commit aggression against small powers.

The ZOP was supported by a large number of countries to varying degrees. Major global and regional powers such as China, Pakistan, the US, the USSR, France, and the UK among others supported the proposal (on various dates and to varying degrees). By the mid-1980s, more than 85 countries around the globe had supported the proposal. However, Nepal’s closest neighbor India had major reservations. While the ZOP was not targeted at India, it could not be denied that India was a major target in terms of why the ZOP was proposed and would require to do the most to ensure the proposal was applied if India accepted given the socio-economic, political and geo-strategic linkages. Accepting the ZOP would mean that India’s ‘special’ position vis-à-vis (Nepal) would be diluted. Similarly, Indira Gandhi could not fathom that Nepal-China relations would be equated with Nepal-India relations. Other governments in India and leaders too had various reservations primarily that India has a special security interest in Nepal and ZOP does not address that.

The Fate of ZOP and Lessons for Nepal’s Foreign Policy

Despite the support of more than six dozen countries including the major powers, the ZOP died its natural death after the demise of Panchayat in 1990, thanks to the Indian reservation. The relations between the King and India also suffered which ultimately culminated in India’s blockade over Nepal in 1989 (though this was not the direct cause). This offers key lessons for Nepal’s foreign policy priorities. Firstly, the geo-economic rationale (in this context, the over-dependence on India) is a severe constraint to Nepal’s foreign policy. India does not hesitate to use such a constraint to undo Nepali strategies that do not address its national interests. Secondly, Nepal can count on the support of other neighbors and major powers. However, they are no substitute for the Indian influence and presence in Nepal. If Nepal aims at the successful implementation of any major foreign policy, it has to assure India that its legitimate security interests will be addressed and brought into confidence. Finally, as the saga unfolded, a foreign policy based on neutrality or equidistance failed to materialize at best, and backfired at worst. Nepal needs to engage with each neighbor and other countries, based on Nepal’s and the other partner’s specific interests. Trying to weigh two different neighbors on the same scale is not prudent as both countries have different interests in Nepal and vice-versa.

References

  1. Poudel, Santosh Sharma. (2019). RC0011 – Nepalese Foreign Policy Practice in the 1950s and 1960s. Nepal Institute for Policy Research (NIPoRe). Kathmandu, Nepal. retrieved from https://nipore.org/nrc0011-nepalese-foreign-policy-practice-in-the-1950s-and-60s-special-relationship-balance-and-diversification/
  2. Upadhyaya, S. K. (1982). Nepal’s Peace Zone Proposal: Many Voices, One concern. Weekly Mirror, Special Issue.
  3. Muni, S.D. (2016). Foreign Policy of Nepal. Adroit Publishers, New Delhi, India.
Research Commentaries

NRC0011 – Nepalese foreign policy practice in the 1950s and 60s: special relationship, balance and diversification

NRC0011 – Nepalese foreign policy practice in the 1950s and 60s: special relationship, balance and diversification

Santosh Sharma Poudel

Synopsis

In the last Research Commentary, I argued that ‘balancing’ as the framing of Nepal’s foreign policy vis-à-vis China and India is problematic: ill-defined, impossible, undesirable and counter-productive. Instead, I argued that ‘diversification’ is the better way forward. In this commentary, I analyze Nepalese foreign policy during the 1950s and 1960s vis-à-vis China and India through those lenses while also assessing the relative success and/or failure of those policies during this period.

Domestic Political Developments

Nepal went through significant political changes in the 1950s and 1960s. This period was tail ended by autocratic Rana regime and Panchayat system with some democratic practice in between. It started with the first wave of the democratic revolution in Nepal, led by Nepali Congress. It led to the overthrow of 104 years long Rana regime. King Tribhuvan returned to the royal throne after taking refuge in India for a while. This was followed by political instability. In the 1950s, Nepal saw nine governments, twice led by the Kings directly. King Mahendra seized the power in 1960 with a stable regime, but the governments and prime ministers changed frequently.

During this period, the rapid political change was reflected in its foreign policy as well. Given the crucial role India played in the first democratic revolution, India had an outsized and overt presence (and interference) in Nepalese politics, especially in the first decade. Nepalese foreign policy revolved around Nepal-India relations.

Special relationship with India

With the signing of the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship just before the overthrow of the Rana regime, the Indo-Nepal relations entered a phase of ‘special relationship’. Some of the clauses in the treaty justified the label of ‘special’ relationship, especially in the context of open-border, reciprocal rights to each other’s citizens, and security arrangement for Nepal.

In light of Nepalese foreign policy during Rana regime, which almost exclusively focused on the relationship with the British, and the active role of India in the democratization of Nepal (to bring a compromise between Nepali Congress, the King, and the Rana regime), it was not totally unexpected. At the same time, China, some parts of which were colonized by Western powers and faced a war between the Nationalist and Communist forces until 1949 was preoccupied with internal developments.

The Nepal-India special relationship continued for about a decade, even though some elites in Nepal had (already?) begun to question the 1950 treaty and Indian heavy-handed approach. Anti-India sentiment became a requisite to be a ‘nationalist’ in Nepal. It was not helped by the Indian attitude and behavior whereby India explicitly believed that Nepal was in India’s ‘sphere of influence’. Some leaders such as Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel openly questioned the sovereignty of Nepal and mulled if Nepal should be brought within the fold of India.

Nepal expanded its diplomatic relations with the US and France by 1949. Yet, Nepal was not able to expand diplomatic relations at the insistence of India. There were discussions about having common ‘defense and foreign’ policies. Even the British and the Americans looked to Indians. Nepal actively followed New Delhi’s guidance.

Three developments in different spheres proved vital in the 1950s. Domestically, King Mahendra became the King in 1955. At the international level, Nepal became a member of the UN. At the diplomatic level, Nepal established diplomatic relations with China.

Experimentation

After King Mahendra ascended the throne, he appointed Tanka Prasad Acharya, a leftist with anti-Indian views as the Prime Minister. He put forth the idea of ‘equal relations’ with India and China, changing the narrative of ‘special relations’ with India on its head. He was able to sign a treaty with China with a relationship based on the principles of Panchshila. Similarly, the direct telegraphic service between Lhasa and Kathmandu was to be started, replacing the need for using the Indian mission. Formerly reticent Chinese started to engage with Nepal actively, and Chinese Premier Zhou En-lai visited Nepal in 1957 and emphasized the ‘blood relations’ between people of the two countries. An agreement was made on the construction of a road linking Kathmandu to Kodari (Chinese border). Nepal also voted differently than India at the UN for the first time in 1957.

Delhi was uncomfortable with the pace scope of Nepal’s increasing engagement with China. In an attempt to lure Nepal back, Delhi promised (an) aid of IRs. 110 million. To show its displeasure at Tanka Prasad Acharya, Delhi provided an unusually lavish welcome to Dr. K.I. Singh, a fierce critic of the Acharya government’s pro-China policy. Given increasing Indian reservations about the Acharya government, King Mahendra dismissed the government and appointed Dr. Singh as the next Prime Minister. For a short period of time, ‘special relations’ became the fervor. China and the Soviet Union were not allowed to establish resident embassies, and no further diplomatic relations were established.

Both the governments had been a part of the ploy of King Mahendra to test the waters and keep India on its toes. India could no longer take it for ‘granted’ that Nepal and Nepalese leaders would bow to India. Once this was accomplished, King Mahendra dismissed the Singh government and had a brief period of direct rule. He promoted ‘diversification’ in relations beyond the immediate neighbors. In 1958, an agreement was made with the US and the USSR to establish resident embassies in respective countries. Nepal came out of the shadows of India and engaged with all the permanent members of the UNSC (China would later join the UNSC replacing Taiwan).

The first elected government of Nepal under the premiership of B.P. Koirala brought forth the policy of neutrality, non-alignment in Sino-Indian dispute and ‘equal friendship’. Some progress was made to ‘balance’ the relations with the two. China would establish a resident embassy in Kathmandu in 1960, but the Mustang incident and Chinese claims over Everest had exposed that relations with China would not be as easy. Shortly, the Koirala government was dismissed in a Royal coup before we could see any sustainable impact on Nepal’s foreign policy.

Diversification?

Upon establishing the direct rule of the King, called Panchayat, the relationship with China, and later with East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) gained momentum. This could be seen from King Mahendra’s 17-day visit to China in 1961 and the signing of the Trade and Transit Treaty with Pakistan. India maintained cautious engagement with the King. The monarch also did not criticize India publicly, despite some subtle maneuver from the Chinese during his visit. During the visit, the King was out-maneuvered to sign agreement on construction of the road. Yet, it proved to be a crucial bargaining chip in Nepal’s relations with India. The disillusioned Indian government gave tacit approval, and some support, to Nepal Congress activists in India to organize violent protests in Nepal and levied economic blockade on Nepal to pressure the government to take a more favorable approach towards India.

The 1962 Sino-Indian border war could not have come at a better time for Nepal. India lifted the economic blockade and advised the rebels to suspend, and eventually terminate, their violent campaign. The King understood that sustained deterioration in relations with India is not a sound policy. So, too realized India. Therefore, the Indian offer of rapprochement was welcomed and promoted, but not at the cost of Sino-Nepal relations. As a result, India maintained some relations with the broad political actors in Nepal, but not at the level that would threaten the Royal regime.

During this period, Nepal sought to diversify its foreign policy, economic relations, aid and defense (all linked for the most part). Nepal started to engage heavily and took some leadership in various international organizations. Nepal became a vocal advocate of land-locked countries. Nepal participated actively in UNCTAD I and II. It culminated in Nepal becoming a member of the United Nations Security Council in 1968, which is probably the highest recognition of Nepalese diplomacy in the international arena so far?.

An agreement was made with India to provide unrestricted transit of Nepalese goods from one part to another via India in 1965. A year later, India agreed to provide separate and self-contained cargo at a port in Calcutta (now Kolkota). Similarly, the emphasis was put on economic expansion and trade with China. Trade agreements were signed with China as well. The trade with East Pakistan did not go as envisaged. Yet, Nepal was able to establish trade relations with Japan, USSR, and Western European countries. In terms of volume, trade with India comprised the lion’s share, yet it was a move in the right direction.

A sense of competition was created among the aid-giving countries. The different approaches the donors followed gave Nepal the flexibility and bite in the formulation of the development budget. Similarly, after the 1962 Sino-India border war, the ability of India to provide adequate defense support to Nepal was limited. Great Britain and the US agreed to provide limited military assistance on a short-term basis, but such support would only be sought if India could not supply the required military equipment.

In this sense, Nepal was able to establish friendly relations with India and China, without altering the essentials of Nepal-India relations. Trade and aid sources were diversified. So was diplomatic relations. Between 1955 and 1969, diplomatic relations were established with an additional 43 countries, both large and small. Nepal had an active presence in the international arena. Nepal exercised more independent foreign policy during this period that it had ever before since the advent of the Rana regime.

What does it mean for now?

Looking back, Nepal experimented with a variety of foreign policy vis-a-vis India and China during the 1950s. None of the ‘special relations’, ‘balance’, or ‘China-card’ tactics became sustainable. Finally, the foreign policy was consolidated and diversification sought in various aspects. That led to the 1960s, which is probably the most successful decade in modern Nepalese foreign policy history. Two major events helped the process. Firstly, it was the stability brought about by the direct rule of the King. Secondly, it was the opportunities brought forth by the rivalry between India and China (who fought a brief border war) and the competition between the USSR and USA globally. Nepal was able to exploit these developments to further its national interests.

These two decades bear some parallels with the situation post-1990 and hence some clear lessons. Firstly, domestic cohesion and a basic understanding of crucial foreign policy issue are must to have a coherent and effective foreign policy. Secondly, active and bold participation in international forums is important, especially for small powers such as Nepal. Thirdly, Nepal should practice broadening its economic, diplomatic, security and aid policy as far as practicable. This does not mean Nepal should ignore the legitimate interests of neighboring countries though. Fourth, foreign countries should be dealt with based on their merit insofar as it helps promote Nepalese national interest. Given that we have not learned most of the lessons, or are unable to practice, the foreign policy of Nepal post-1990s has been a case of failure for the most part.

References
  1. Ministry of External Affairs, India, Treaty of Peace and Friendship, retrieved from: https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6295/Treaty+of+Peace+and+Friendship
  2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nepal, Bilateral Relations, retrieved from: https://mofa.gov.np/foreign-policy/bilateral-relation/
  3. Poudel, Santosh Sharma, RC004 Framing Nepal’s Relations with China and India, Nepal Institute for Policy Research, retrieved from: https://nipore.org/framing-nepals-relations-with-china-and-india-balance-or-diversify/
  4. Rose, Leo E. (1971). Nepal: Strategy for Survival, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Publisher’s Note: This commentary is the second write-up in a series of scholarly pieces. The third write-up will be the analysis of Nepalese foreign policy in the 1970s and 1980s. The case of post-1990s foreign policy will be analyzed on fourth write-up.