02Dec2023

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Tag: China-SAARC Relations

OP-EDs and Columns

Putting national interest first

NISCHAL Dhungel* and ABIJIT SHARMA

Dhungel is a non-resident fellow at NIPoRe. The opinion piece originally appeared in The Kathmandu Post on 18 January 2023. Please read the original article here.

With the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war, foreign relations trembled among major economic powers. While condemning Russia’s aggression and barraging the country with a series of sanctions, the West expected India to follow suit. However, New Delhi adopted studied public neutrality and abstained from successive votes condemning the Russian move in the UN Security Council, General Assembly, and Human Rights Council. Just like India, China maintained relative neutrality, with a solid foreign policy stance in response to the conflict. Despite its closeness with Russia, Beijing stopped short of supporting it in the war. It also stopped short of calling Russia the aggressor and abstained from a United Nations Security Council vote denouncing the ‘invasion’. Beijing and New Delhi had made their decision loud and clear. And they were not going to listen to anybody.

Assertive New Delhi

Speaking at the Globsec 2022 forum in Slovakia, Minister of External Affairs of India, Dr S Jaishankar laid clear India’s increasingly confident foreign policy. “Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems,” Jaishankar said. He criticised the West for hoarding vaccines, which impacted the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). It is crucial to understand how India came to this position, which was unimaginable until a few years ago.

India’s political, social and economic fabric had been damaged after 200 years of colonialism. Its foreign policy could not remain untouched. Following independence, New Delhi slowly started to chart its own path, pursuing different strategic approaches from 1946 to 2013. Nehruvian influence persisted from 1946 to 62, an era of strategic non-alignment amidst US-Soviet Union rivalry. From 1962 to 1971, considered the decade of realism and recovery, India made pragmatic choices in national security and political challenges despite a lack of resources. The country went through a complex phase from 1971 to 1991 as the US-China-Pakistan axis came up. From 1991 to 1999, it had challenges in retaining its strategic autonomy in a unipolar world, whereas from 2000 to 2013, India focused on balancing power.

But since assuming office in 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made an unprecedented transformation of Indian foreign policy. Modi has put India as an emerging superpower on the map and sought to engage rather than remain ‘non-aligned actively’. New Delhi now understands that it deals with multiple global complexities, making decisions based on calculated risk-taking. As a result, India is slowly standing out, drifting away from strategic ambiguity to strategic freedom and taking a solid foreign policy stance on international fora. This is a significant departure from the older ‘non-alignment’ tenet that had long established India’s typical social values and norms, at least in foreign relations.

India’s central foreign policy tenet under Modi is seen to be guided by the Eastern principle of ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’, which translates to “the world is one family”. This was evident during the Covid-19 pandemic when New Delhi delivered more than 100 million doses to countries in Asia and Africa. While Modi has spearheaded this new brand of foreign policy, his bureaucrats and ministers have helped implement it. In 2015, just two days before his retirement, the Narendra Modi government appointed a highly agile foreign service officer, a foreign ambassador to the US and China, to the position of foreign secretary. Jaishankar has been the flag bearer of Modi’s foreign policy ever since Modi’s second term in office. Jaishankar openly admits India’s shortcomings and stays committed to securing its national interest with/without taking any sides.

‘Wolf-warrior’ in Beijing

Coinciding with India’s assertive stance in global politics is China’s equally aggressive stance, especially against the West. The Chinese foreign policy has been so assertive and aggressive in recent years that it has earned a new name: ‘Wolf-warrior’. While aggressive Chinese rhetoric might appear quite normal now, it is a shift from China’s earlier foreign policy. And the man to bring about this shift is none other than Xi Jinping. At heart, Xi’s diplomacy calls for a more active role for China as a great power on the world stage, including reforming the Western-dominated international order and creating what China calls “true multilateralism”.

When the architect of China’s economic reform, Deng Xiaoping, came to power following Mao Zedong’s death in the late 1970s, he prescribed a foreign policy which was subtle and cooperative. His approach focused on “biding one’s time without revealing one’s strength”. As a result, in the 1980s and 90s, Beijing was focused on “securing position, coping with affairs calmly and hiding capacities”. The leaders who came to power after Deng continued the policy.

But Xi’s ascendance since 2012 has slowly changed things in Beijing. Far from “biding time and hiding strengths”, it is now focused on making its stance clear on the global stage. Most importantly, it is open to show its strength. Take, for instance, its recent response to the Taiwan issue. Just before the then US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited the island in August last year, the Chinese President issued a stern warning to his American counterpart, allegedly saying that “… those who play with fire would perish by it”. When its alarm went unheeded, the Chinese military launched targeted military exercises.

Xi’s ambitions to help China regain its glory of the Middle Kingdom years have been evident since he took office. Upon gaining power in 2012, he immediately identified “national rejuvenation” as his primary goal. The ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was announced a year later. At the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi stated that China would no longer shy away from world leadership and efforts shaping the international order. The BRI is an important example of how China has pursued its foreign policy interest. The initiative has 147 signatories and includes US allies and partners such as Saudi Arabia, Greece and UAE.

Quite naturally, the West has been critical of this stance, often saying that it might invite dangerous confrontations between China and the West. But Beijing has maintained that it is not the real aggressor but simply responding to Western threats. Defending China’s aggressive foreign policy, the then-Chinese Foreign Vice Minister Le Yucheng said last year that Beijing “had no choice but to fight back against constant ‘nagging’ and ‘insults’ from foreign critics”. Interestingly China has many flag bearers of this new assertive foreign policy, most notably the foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian. Zhao has had public spats with US diplomats and has been a vocal critic of the West.

If there is any lesson that Nepal should learn from its neighbours, it is that we need to pursue an independent foreign policy, especially in light of the geo-political games often played in the country.

OP-EDs and Columns

Nepal’s Ad Hoc Policies Toward China

– SANTOSH Sharma Poudel

The column originally appeared in The Diplomat on 25 August 2022. Please read the original article here.

A day after U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, Chinese Ambassador to Nepal Hou Yanqi released a statement denouncing the visit. In the statement, Hou “highly appreciated” Nepal’s longstanding commitment to the One China principle.

In a subtle warning, she reminded Nepal that the One China principle was the foundation of Sino-Nepali relations and expressed hope that Kathmandu would continue to abide by the principle and support China’s legitimate interests. Hou also urged cooperation to “defend each other’s sovereignty, security and territorial integrity.”

Then on August 5, Hou met with Nepali Home Minister Bal Krishna Khand. In the meeting, Khand reassured the Chinese envoy of Nepal’s position on the One China policy. Nepal would not allow any forces to use Nepali territory for “anti-China separatist activities,” he said.

This was followed by a hastily arranged trip of Nepali Foreign Minister Narayan Khadka to Beijing on August 9-11 at the invitation of China’s State Councilor and Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi. Both countries billed his trip as a return visit in the wake of Wang’s visit to Nepal in March.

Khadka’s visit also followed two high-level Chinese visits in recent months. However, the timing and both countries’ statements during and after the visit indicate that Pelosi’s Taiwan visit was a critical factor.

Nepal frequently reiterates its commitments in support of the One China policy and “not allowing Nepali land to be used against Chinese interests.” Prime ministers, foreign ministers, foreign secretaries, and others in leadership positions across time and political parties have restated these commitments to the Chinese. Nepali Foreign Policy 2077 also codifies the latter. As Hou stated, these are the foundations of China-Nepal relations.

There is little doubt that Nepal is sincerely committed to these principles and policies. Unfortunately, Nepal’s understanding of the implications of those principles is less clear-cut.

The implications of the One China principle are relatively easy to understand. Under the principle, Nepal (as do most countries worldwide) believes the People’s Republic of China to be the sole representative of China. In that context, Tibet and Taiwan are parts of China. Thus, Nepal has helped repress the political activities of the Tibetan refugees because China considers the Dalai Lama a separatist.

The implication of Nepal’s second commitment — i.e. not allowing its territory to be used for activities that could undermine Chinese interests — is more complex. The principle is sensible but requires an understanding and agreement between Nepal and China on what legitimate Chinese interests are.

Nepal’s lack of a shared national understanding allows for ad hoc decision-making. Also, not all of Nepal’s interests align perfectly with Chinese interests.

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a $500-million grant program from the U.S. to build transport and energy infrastructure in Nepal, tested the principle. Beijing was fiercely opposed to Nepal ratifying the agreement and vocal in raising its concerns. Experts in Nepal were bitterly divided over whether Chinese security concerns regarding the grant were legitimate. Eventually, Nepal went ahead with the ratification, displeasing Beijing. Nepal has sought to reassure Beijing that its interests would not be harmed.

In July, Nepal wrote a letter to the U.S. government rescinding the State Partnership Program (SPP), an exchange program between an American state’s National Guard and a partner foreign country. Nepal and the Utah National Guard signed the SPP in 2019. In Beijing’s perception, the agreement is part of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy.

Despite American clarifications that the SPP is not a security or military alliance, Nepal decided to withdraw from the agreement to address Chinese sensitivity on the issue.

Nepal may have a rationale for both decisions, but they point to the ad hoc nature of understanding what constitutes actions against the interest of its neighbors. Such behavior opens the door for influence peddling or even bullying, especially given the meek nature of Nepali bureaucrats and political leaders vis-à-vis their Chinese counterparts.

Additionally, the need for Nepal to regurgitate those principles in every meeting with Chinese leaders indicates China’s insecurity over developments in its neighborhood. Beijing may also be justifiably concerned with Nepal’s ability to implement the principles, though it has praised Nepal’s efforts to limit the activities of Tibetan refugees.

Either way, it is high time that foreign and security policy stakeholders in Nepal reach a common minimum consensus. It would help Nepal engage China on an equal footing. At the same time, it will clarify what Nepali “red lines” are to Beijing. Without such understanding, Nepali policies will continue to be ad hoc and reactionary.

Research Commentaries

NRC0017 – Xi, Modi and Nepal’s ‘balance’

Santosh Sharma Poudel

Synopsis

President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping visited Nepal on 12-13 October for his first state visit, 23 years after President Jiang Zemin’s state visit to the Himalayan nation in December 1996. The much-anticipated visit by the Chinese President went smoothly but created a ripple in Nepal and immediate neighborhood. Nepal shares a 1400km long border. President Xi’s visit shows the growing presence and significance of Nepal in the international arena. It is also a return to normalcy in Sino-Nepal relations. As of October 2019, President Xi has visited each member of SAARC’s original seven (minus Bhutan with whom China has no official relations) member countries.

Strategic timing?

The visit by a Chinese President to Nepal was long overdue. The last Chinese President to visit Nepal was Jiang Zemin in December 1996. Both Nepal and China have gone through drastic domestic changes and the region has transformed, thanks primarily to the rise of China (and India). To briefly summarize the domestic changes in Nepal, Nepal has gone through the 10-year Maoist insurgency, successfully entered into the electoral democracy in collaboration with mainstream parties, became a republic (from a constitutional monarchy), had two constituent assembly elections (the latter of which produced the Constitution of Nepal, 2015), and elected a first majority Communist government in 2017.

During the same time, China has been through the phase of ‘peaceful development’ under Hu Jintao and ‘national rejuvenation’ under President Xi. China has been able to lift up the GDP per capita from USD 981 to almost USD9000 according to World Bank. China embarked on a major effort to root out corruption and removed the two-term limit for the President. China is also striving to achieve two centenary goals (moderately well-off nation by 2021 and strong, democratic, harmonious, civilized and modern socialist country by 2049). Globally, China is a force to be reckoned with, especially after 2008. China has emerged as a global power, and taking initiatives and responsibilities commensurate with its power. President Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are prime examples. The former transverses more than half of the globe.

After 1996 only Chinese Prime Ministers Zhu Rongji and Wen Jiabao visited Nepal in 2001 and 2012 respectively. Meanwhile, King Gyanendra (2002 and 2005), then incumbent Prime Ministers Pushpa Kamal Dahal (2008), Madhav Kumar Nepal (2009), Sushil Koirala (2014), Khadga Prasad Oli (2016) and Bidhya Devi Bhandari (2019) have visited China during the same period. President Xi’s visit restores the normalcy in the diplomatic exchange between Nepal and China.

In saying that, the timing of the visit is no coincidence. After the promulgation of the Constitution (2015) and the national and local elections (2017), Nepal has entered a peaceful and stable phase. It also helps that Nepal has a democratically elected majority Communist government, the Nepal Communist Party [named so after the merger between CPN (UML) and CPN (Maoist Center) after the latest elections].

At regional level, the competition between China and India for influence in South Asian states has increased in recent decades. China’s active engagement with small coastal and island states in South Asia which India dub as ‘string of pearls’ has raised concerns in New Delhi. Additionally, Beijing’s active promotion of Belt and Road initiative (India has not joined yet) had challenged India’s ‘sphere of influence’. This has thrusted Nepal to the forefront of regional geo-politics. At the same time, it is too simplistic to label India and China as rivals, and President Xi also stated that India and China are partners. The increased trade links between India and China has necessitated further connectivity. In that context, the idea of the role of Nepal as transit state has come to the fore. This has pushed Nepal to the forefront of geo-economics as well.

Globally, the competition between China and the US for regional influence has propelled Nepal in the forefront of global geopolitics. The introduction of the Indo-Pacific Strategy by the US, which is perceived by Beijing as an attempt to contain China, has increased strategic significance for/of Nepal. Therefore, serious issues of national, regional and global enduring significance were at stake and Xi’s visit.

Significance of the visit

The visit by the Chinese President is symbolically very important. President Xi’s visit was able to elevate Nepal-China relations. The relations between Nepal and China was upgraded to ‘Strategic Partnership’ of Cooperation Featuring Ever-Lasting Friendship for Development and Prosperity from ‘friendly relations’ or ‘time-tested friendly relations’. This means China sees Nepal as a long-term and stable partner focused on the larger picture of China-Nepal relations. This also comes with the expectation that there will be more foreign policy stability in Nepala. This is also emblematically important in Asian context where ‘status’ is taken very seriously, therefore, the labels used to define relations between states are important by themselves.

The talks and agreement during Xi’s visit mostly focused on BRI, Trans-Himalayan network and connectivity. The current visit and agreement have provided decisive guidance in that context. It was agreed to conduct feasibility studies for cross-Himalayan railways and China committed to extend cooperation on Kathmandu-Pokhara-Lumbini railways. China would also support the speeding up of upgrading and restoring the existing road networks. This will have immediate impact on connectivity. The number of agreements pertaining to infrastructure (mostly transportation) indicates the importance of connectivity to both Nepal and China.

President Xi’s visit is also significant domestically. Nepal has a democratically elected communist party in power. Globally, it’s a rarity and anachronistic. On top of that, the Nepal Communist Party (NCP)(named so after the merger) ran on a nationalist rhetoric in the aftermath of Indian blockade. Hence, the visit of President Xi enhances the legitimacy of the current government and provides for a ‘balanced’ relations vis-à-vis China and India. Beijing should be eagerly following the political fate of NCP in Nepal as China experiments with elections at local levels. While Nepal bears no direct resemblance to China’s political structure, the success (or failure) of the Communist party in Nepal could have a bearing on the democratization debate in China.

This visit also served as an opportunity for China to criticize Nepal (indirectly) on its dismal implementation of previously signed accords. President Xi reminded that China made plans and implemented them which led to success. It was not a subtle reminder to Nepal that agreements alone will not lead to progress without implementation. Hopefully, the message got across to Nepal’s political elites.

Zero-sum game?

Many analysts in Nepal, and more so in India, see Nepal’s deepening relations, especially in context to connectivity, with China and Xi’s visit as a counter-balance to Indian influence. Some extremists even view it as Chinese attempt at encircling India. However, nothing could be further from the truth. The connectivity of Nepal with China is both complementary to Nepal’s connectivity with India and India’s connectivity with China. At the same time, the agreements signed with India after Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power and the ones signed during President Xi’s visit is not competitive in essence. If anything, it’s the opposite.

The joint statement between Nepal and India during Modi’s visit to Nepal in 2014 underlined the need to further explore ways to enhance sub-regional cooperation, particularly in areas of trade, transit, connectivity and hydropower. Indian and Nepalese Prime Minister directed the finalization and signing of Rail Service Agreement, Letter of Exchanges on Trade and Transit, and ratification of BITTA among others. Even based on these agreements, it is very clear that both China and India are both looking for connectivity, investment in infrastructure, and ease in the investment regime for foreign investors in Nepal.

Even from Nepalese perspective, for any expensive connectivity network (especially the railways) through the Himalayas to be viable, it inadvertently has to extend beyond Nepal’s Southern borders to India. The trade between Nepal and China (especially exports from Nepal to China) cannot sustain such an expensive connectivity by itself. Therefore, Nepal needs to facilitate trade between India and China, which is close to USD 90 billion, and link Chinese West to Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, the two most populous Indian states which have no direct link to sea port. While India has not joined BRI (but is part of other corridors such as BCIM), India too would be one of the major beneficiaries of connectivity. To borrow Chinese parlance, it’s a win-win cooperation with mutual benefits to all three nations.

Moving forward

President Xi’s visit to Nepal is significant by itself for reasons stated above. While it has implications for Nepal-India relations, it would be foolhardy to see it completely in the context of China and India rivalry. Even Beijing and New Delhi do not see themselves as ‘rivals’. In such a case, it’s prudent for Nepal to move past thinking of China as a card to play against India or vice-versa. Nepal’s relationship with India and China has its own significance, dimensions and merits. The zero-sum mentality will only hold back Nepal’s development and limit the perimeter of Nepalese foreign policy. Instead, we are better for engaging them both in a mutually beneficial relationship. The agreements and statements from President Xi’s visit and PM Modi’s first visit to Nepal are testaments that win-win cooperation is possible.

Endnote

a* This interpretation is based on Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s explanation of Strategic partnership during his trip to Europein 2004. He described strategic partnership as:

By ‘strategic’, it means that the cooperation should be long-term and stable, bearing on the larger picture of China-EU relations. It transcends the differences in ideology and social system and is not subjected to the impacts of individual events that occur from time to time. By ‘partnership’, it means that the cooperation should be equal-footed, mutually beneficial and win-win. The two sides should base themselves on mutual respect and mutual trust, endeavour to expand converging interests and seek common ground on the major issues while shelving differences on the minor ones.

References

  1. China Daily. (September, 2019). Xi stresses striving for national rejuvenation. Retrieved from https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201909/12/WS5d7a2e49a310cf3e3556b4df.html
  2. Feng, Z. and Huang, J. (2014). China’s Strategic Partnership Diplomacy. European Strategic Partnership Observatory. Retrieved from https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/181324/China%E2%80%99s%20strategic%20partnership%20diplomacy_%20engaging%20with%20a%20changing%20world%20.pdf
  3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Nepal. (October, 2019). Joint Statement between Nepal and PRC. Retrieved from https://mofa.gov.np/joint-statement-between-nepal-and-the-peoples-republic-of-china-2/
  4. Nepal Institute for Policy Research (NIPoRe). (Oct 2019). NDV004 – President Xi Jinping’s state visits – SAARC vs. ASEAN. Retrieved from https://nipore.org/ndv0004-president-xi-jinpings-state-visits-saarc-vs-asean/
  5. Nepal’s Embassy in China. (July, 2013). Joint statement between Nepal and PRC. Retrieved from http://np.china-embassy.org/eng/ChinaNepal/t1057401.htm
  6. PRC White Paper on peaceful development. (2011). Retrieved from http://ph.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/peace/t895028.htm
  7. State Council of the People’s Republic of China. (2019). China and the World in the new era. Retrieved from http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201909/27/content_WS5d8d80f9c6d0bcf8c4c142ef.html
  8. World Bank. (2019). GDP per capita (current US$). Retrieved from https://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=ny_gdp_pcap_cd&idim=country:CHN:IND:RUS&hl=en&dl=en
  9. Xinhua Net. (October, 2019). Xi’s article on Nepalese newspapers. Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-07/15/c_133485834.htm [Nepali version of the article is available at: https://ekantipur.com/opinion/2019/10/11/1570759989337122.html]